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The dissertation consists of three studies examining three different regulatory issues that 
affect the auditing profession.  The first study has two main foci.  First, the study investigates the 
impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on the Big 4 fee premium.  Second, the study investigates 
the relationship between the size of an audit client and annual fee change.  The results show that 
in the post-SOX environment, clients of non-Big 4 firms have experienced greater increases in 
audit fees than the clients of the Big 4 firms, resulting in a diminishing Big 4 premium. This is 
consistent with the notion that non-Big 4 clients had to make significant adjustments to meet 
post-SOX quality requirements by increasing their effort (and consequently audit fees).  The 
results also show audit firms’ large clients experience the largest percentage increase in audit 
fees.  This is consistent with the theoretical view of consumer surplus, where the large clients, 
with more resources, have greater levels of consumer surplus, which is being captured by the 
audit firms.  The study contributes to our understanding of the impact of SOX on audit fee 
premium and the economics of audit market competition in different client segments.   
The second study is focused on three main areas: 1) the relationship between audit fees 
and audit market concentration on a country level; 2) the effect of a country’s litigation regime 
on the relationship between audit fees and market concentration and 3) the inter-relations 
between competition, fees, and quality in the market for audit services.  The study is motivated 
by the current debate in the United States and the European Union about the possible problems 
associated with the current oligopolistic structure of the audit market.  The contribution of this 
study lies in the fact that it provides a multi-national empirical investigation of the audit 
competition-fee relationship, and examination of how country-level fees affect the competition-
quality relationship, while controlling for country level factors.  Results show a negative 
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relationship between country-level market concentration and audit fees but only in highly 
litigious countries, suggesting that the firms are able to obtain economies of scale in more 
concentrated markets and are willing to pass savings down to their clients.  However this 
relationship only holds for the clients of the Big N firms.  Analysis of audit quality suggests that 
audit quality is higher in more concentrated markets but mediation analysis did not show that the 
fees mediate the relationship between audit quality and market concentration.   
  
The third study addresses current regulatory debate about the responsibility of the 
principal auditor in the group audit environment.  Current United States standards allow the 
principal auditor to disavow responsibility for parts of the audit which were performed by a third 
party auditor by referencing them in the auditor’s opinion and then indicating the part of the 
audit which was performed by them.  This disclaimer of responsibility is prohibited under the 
international auditing standards, which require the principal auditor to be responsible for the 
entire group audit.  Specifically, this study examines 1) audit quality implications related to such 
opinions, and 2) the relationship between having a shared opinion and audit fees.  The results 
show that the audit quality is significantly lower for the firms whose audit opinion referenced a 
third party auditor.  The results also provide some evidence that audit fees are lower in shared 







I am grateful for the guidance provided by my dissertation committee chair, Greg Trompeter, as 
well as my committee members, Sean Robb, Robin Roberts (both of the University of Central 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... x 
MARKET SEGMENTATION AND PREMIUM PRICING IN THE POST-SARBANES-
OXLEY MARKET FOR AUDIT SERVICES ............................................................................... 1 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1 
Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act .............................................................................................. 3 
Prior research .......................................................................................................................... 5 
Hypothesis development ......................................................................................................... 8 
Client Segments ........................................................................................................................ 12 
Consumer surplus.................................................................................................................. 12 
Client importance .................................................................................................................. 14 
Methods..................................................................................................................................... 15 
Results ....................................................................................................................................... 18 
Sample, descriptive statistics and univariate tests. ............................................................... 18 
Multivariate results. .............................................................................................................. 19 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 26 
Tables ........................................................................................................................................ 28 
References ................................................................................................................................. 34 
REGULATORY DEBATE ON AUDIT MARKET COMPETITION, AUDIT QUALITY AND 
AUDIT FEES: AN INTERNATIONAL EXAMINATION ......................................................... 38 
vii 
 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 38 
Background ............................................................................................................................... 40 
Structure of the Audit Market ............................................................................................... 40 
Potential Problems Related to the Current Structure of the Audit Market ........................... 41 
Potential Advantages of the Current Market Structure. ........................................................ 42 
Audit Market Structure and Regulatory Environment .......................................................... 43 
Audit Market Structure and Regulatory Bodies.................................................................... 44 
Effect of Competition on Audit Fees ........................................................................................ 47 
Prior Research ....................................................................................................................... 47 
Research Question Development .......................................................................................... 50 
Competition and Audit Quality – Mediating Effect of Audit Fees ........................................... 52 
Prior research ........................................................................................................................ 52 
Hypothesis development ....................................................................................................... 54 
Research Methods ..................................................................................................................... 55 
Concentration Measures........................................................................................................ 55 
Results ....................................................................................................................................... 61 
Research Questions ............................................................................................................... 61 
Hypothesis 1.......................................................................................................................... 66 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 67 
Tables ........................................................................................................................................ 69 
viii 
 
References ................................................................................................................................. 77 
ACCEPTING FULL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE AUDIT OPINION: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
AUDIT QUALITY AND AUDIT FEES ...................................................................................... 83 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 83 
Institutional Background ........................................................................................................... 85 
United States Standards ........................................................................................................ 85 
International Standards ......................................................................................................... 88 
Shared Opinions, Audit Quality and Audit Fees ...................................................................... 89 
Methods..................................................................................................................................... 92 
Measure of audit quality ....................................................................................................... 92 
Hypotheses testing ................................................................................................................ 93 
Sample Selection ....................................................................................................................... 96 
Quality Analysis.................................................................................................................... 97 
Fee Analysis .......................................................................................................................... 98 
Results ....................................................................................................................................... 99 
H1: Quality analysis .............................................................................................................. 99 
H2: Fee Analysis ................................................................................................................. 101 
Discussion and Conclusions ................................................................................................... 102 
Additional Analysis ................................................................................................................ 105 
Characteristics of Companies with Shared Opinions .......................................................... 105 
ix 
 
Tables ...................................................................................................................................... 108 






LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics – Market Segmentation and Premium Pricing ............................ 28 
Table 2 - Correlation Matrix - Market Segmentation and Premium Pricing ................................ 29 
Table 3 - Multivariate Results Using a Continuous Measure of Client Importance ..................... 31 
Table 4 - Multivariate Results Using Indicator Variables for Client Importance ......................... 32 
Table 5 – Impact of the PCAOB ................................................................................................... 33 
Table 6 – Descriptive Statistics by Country – Big N Firms ......................................................... 69 
Table 7 - Descriptive Statistics – Big N Firms ............................................................................. 70 
Table 8 - Correlation Matrix – Big N Firms ................................................................................. 71 
Table 9 - Multivariate Results – Big N Firms............................................................................... 72 
Table 10 - Effect of the Litigation Regime – Big N firms ............................................................ 73 
Table 11 - Multivariate Results – non-Big 4 Firms ...................................................................... 74 
Table 12 - Effect of the Litigation Regime for non-Big N firms .................................................. 75 
Table 13 - Mediation Analysis ...................................................................................................... 76 
Table 14 – Industry Summary ..................................................................................................... 108 
Table 15 - Summary by Year ...................................................................................................... 109 
Table 16 - Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests – Quality Analysis ................................ 110 
Table 17 - Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests – Fee Analysis ...................................... 111 
Table 18 - Correlation Matrix - Quality Analysis ....................................................................... 112 
Table 19 - Table Correlation Matrix - Fee Analysis ................................................................... 113 
Table 20 - Multivariate Results – Quality Analysis.................................................................... 113 




MARKET SEGMENTATION AND PREMIUM PRICING IN THE POST-
SARBANES-OXLEY MARKET FOR AUDIT SERVICES 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study is two-fold.  In the first part of the paper, I investigate the 
differences between annual changes in audit fees charged by the Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms in the 
post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) environment.  One of the main purposes of SOX was increasing 
audit quality, which, as prior research showed, also resulted in increased fees (Ghosh and 
Pawlewicz, 2009; Bhamornsiri et al.,2009; Griffin and Lont, 2007).  Studying the differences in 
changes in audit fees between the Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms allows me to examine whether SOX 
had unintended consequences in terms of affecting the competitive structure of the audit market.  
If in the post-SOX environment the gap between the Big 4 and non-Big 4 increases, then this 
would suggest that SOX allowed the Big 4 to increase their oligopolistic powers and to further 
increase their fees.  On the other hand if the Big 4/non-Big 4 gap diminishes, this would suggest 
a “leveling of the playing field”, where smaller audit firms used new requirements established by 
SOX to bring their fees closer to the fees charged by the Big 4.   
I argue that SOX changed the regulatory regime faced by auditors of the SEC registrants, 
and this change impacted the Big 4 and non-Big 4 differently.  I then present and test two 
theoretical arguments that give conflicting predictions about the effect of SOX on the Big 4 and 
non-Big 4 fees.  This study extends the work by Ghosh and Pawlewicz (2009) and Grifin and 
Lont (2007) by investigating how the gap between the Big4 and non-Big4 fees (Big 4 premium) 
changed in the post-SOX environment.  Ghosh and Pawlewicz (2009) find that Big 4 clients 
experienced higher increases in audit fees than non-Big 4 clients, but their study does not control 
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for the SOX 404 effects.  Griffin and Lont (2007) show that audit fees increased post-SOX, but 
they look only at the Big 4 clients.  This manuscript extends prior research by using a sample 
which controls for major elements that affect audit fees: I include both Big 4 as well as non-Big 
4 companies, and include only  observations that comply with SOX 404(b), though not in the 
initial year of adoption in order to avoid confounds.  I find that in the post-SOX environment, 
clients of non-Big 4 firms experienced higher percentage fee increases than client of the Big4 
firms, suggesting that the Big 4 fee premium has diminished after SOX.  This is consistent with 
the notion that non-Big 4 firms had to make larger adjustments to their audits than the Big 4 
firms in order to comply with stricter regulatory requirements imposed by SOX.   
The second part of this study is also focused on the fee changes in the post-SOX 
environment.  However in this study I investigate whether audit firms have different pricing 
strategies for their large and small clients.  I investigate which clients (large or small, as 
compared to the other clients in each firm’s portfolio) experienced the largest change in audit 
fees after the passage of SOX.  Similar to the analysis of audit firms (discussed previously), I 
present and test two competing theoretical arguments on how fees paid by large and small clients 
are affected by a change in the regulatory regime.  The results show that large clients (as 
compared to other clients in the audit firm portfolio) have experienced the greatest percentage 
increases in audit fees.  This supports the theoretical notion that large clients, which have more 
resources, have higher levels of consumer surplus which is captured by the audit firms.  The 
study extends the work by Ghosh and Lustgarten (2006) by investigating which subgroup of 
clients experiences the greatest audit fee changes.   
The study contributes to our knowledge of the effect of regulation on the economics of 
audit market competition.  While the Big 4 fee premium is a commonly used concept in the 
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auditing literature, very little research has examined how it has changed over time and how it is 
impacted by regulation, especially regulation as significant as SOX.    Furthermore, little is 
known about which client segments drive the Big 4 fee premium and changes in the level of that 
premium over time in the United States.   
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section includes the discussion of the impact 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the auditing profession and specifically the differential impact on 
the Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms.  The following section provides theoretical views on the 
relationship between audit fees and client segments.  The subsequent section describes the 
methods.  The last two sections include the results and the conclusion. 
Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, passed as a response to accounting scandals like Enron 
and WorldCom, included a number of changes that directly affected the accounting profession. 
The Act: 
 included section 404(b) which requires certain registrants to obtain an assessment of 
internal controls from an independent accounting firm
1
.   
 created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, which is responsible for 
overseeing firms that conduct financial statement audits for SEC registrants.   
 increased enforcement power for the Securities and Exchange Commission.   
                                                 
1
 Large accelerated and accelerated filers have been required to comply with 404(b) since 
November 15, 2004.  The compliance date for non-accelerated filers was pushed back for several 




These, and other aspects of SOX, have directly affected the economics of the market for 
audit services, in part by driving up the costs of those services.  Simunic (1980) proposes that 
audit firms have two main cost drivers: effort and litigation. SOX has significantly affected the 
fees charged by the audit firms by affecting these cost drivers.   
SOX contains several provisions that require an increase in audit firm effort (e.g. new 
requirements were introduced related to off-balance sheet transactions and increased auditor 
communication with the audit committee).  However the provision of SOX that had the most 
significant effect on audit effort was Section 404 (b).  This section required SEC registrants to 
engage an independent accounting firm to provide an annual evaluation of the registrant’s 
internal control effectiveness.  This evaluation of internal controls required significant effort on 
the part of audit firms, especially in the first year of adoption.  Research has shown that this 
additional effort led to increased audit fees.  For example, Raghunandan and Rama (2006) find 
that in the initial year of 404(b) compliance, audit fees increase 86%.  Bhamornsiri et al. (2009) 
go beyond the first year of Section 404 adoption; their results show a large increase in audit fees 
related to initial Section 404 adoption (65% as compared to the prior year), but almost no 
increase (0.9%) in the second year (relative to the first year) of Section 404 compliance.   
The second major audit fee driver proposed by Simunic (1980) is legal liability: expected 
loss from an audit failure.  This determinant of fees is affected by the provisions of SOX that 
created a change in the regulatory regime in the US.  SOX established the PCAOB with the main 
purpose of improving the quality of audits.  SOX also required all auditors of SEC registrants to 
register with the PCAOB.  The PCAOB has the authority to conduct inspections and 
investigations concerning registered public accounting firms, and enforce their compliance with 
SOX.  Therefore all PCAOB registered audit firms, regardless of size, faced increased quality 
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requirements after the passage of SOX.  All else equal, increased quality requirements could lead 
to higher chances of audit failures, which could in its turn lead to litigation.  SOX further 
strengthened the law enforcement power of the SEC.  SOX Section 308(a) established Fair 
Funds, which are the funds that the SEC can distribute to defrauded investors.  Prior to SOX, the 
SEC could only distribute disgorgements to investors. Now, the SEC can distribute penalties in 
addition to disgorgements.  This increase of potential civil payouts to investors could mean 
larger settlements from law suits against auditors.  So creation of the PCAOB increased the 
chance of litigation against an audit firm, and new enforcement powers of the SEC increased the 
potential legal settlement against auditors.  As such audit firms have higher liability after SOX, 
and so I argue that SOX created a regulatory regime change with respect to auditors’ legal 
liability, that would also lead to an increase in the work performed by auditors.  
While Simunic (1980) proposes that there are two primary cost drivers – effort and 
litigation – these two functions are not necessarily independent.  For example, fear of litigation 
or other government intervention can cause auditors to increase audit effort in an attempt to 
improve audit quality and, presumably, reduce the likelihood of costly external intervention 
either through the courts (litigation) or through governmental oversight (e.g. costs related to an 
unfavorable PCAOB inspection).  Thus, although effort and litigation are separate cost factors, it 
is recognized that they are inter-related.    
Prior research 
Early audit market research established the existence of the Big 4 fee premium (Francis, 
1984; Francis and Stokes, 1986; Francis and Simon, 1987).  Since that time, the premium has 
been a focus of a number of published works (e.g. Choi et al., 2010, Choi et al., 2008; Basioudis 
and Franics, 2007) and been used as a control variable in dozens more (e.g., Whisenant et al., 
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2003; Geiger and Rama, 2003; Craswell et al., 1995).  This study extends that prior work by 
examining factors that drive the magnitude of the premium (e.g. regulation and client portfolio 
composition).   
In more recent work, Ghosh and Pawlewicz (2009) (G&P) investigated the impact of 
SOX on audit fees.  Using a sample drawn from 2000-2005, they find that the Big 4 clients have 
paid 43% more audit fees in the post-SOX compared to the pre-SOX environment.  One of the 
largest drivers of the post-SOX increase in audit fees is Section 404(b) implementation, as shown 
by Raghunandan and Rama (2006) and Bhamornsiri et al. (2009).  Implementation of 404(b) 
became mandatory in 2004 for large accelerated and accelerated filers.  A large accelerated filer 
is defined by the SEC as an issuer “with the market cap of $700 million or more.  Further, an 
accelerated filer is defined as an issuer with the market cap of $75 million or more”, (SEC, 
2005).  Given their size and complexity, these registrants are more likely to have Big 4 auditors.   
SOX 404(b) compliance for other filers (non-accelerated filers) was postponed several times, and 
finally eliminated by the Dodd-Frank Act
2
.  Non-accelerated filers are smaller (public float of 
under $75 million) and typically less complex.  As such they are more likely (in comparison to 
accelerated filers and large accelerated filers) to have non-Big 4 auditors.   
As argued earlier, the provisions of SOX that have made the most impact on audit fees 
are Section 404(b) requirements and the regulatory regime change brought about by the creation 
of the PCAOB.  The design used by G&P contains a potential confound based on inherent 
differences in the client bases of the Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms.  Specifically, it considers audit 
fees paid by the Big 4 clients (including many large accelerated and accelerated filers) which 
                                                 
2
 While a number of non-accelerated filers voluntarily complied with Section 404(b), they started 
complying later, and less than 3% voluntarily complied before 2006 (based on the SOX 404(b) 
compliance data from Audit Analytics and market capitalization data from Compustat). 
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were affected by both the regulatory regime change and Section 404, and compares those fees to 
audit fees of non-Big 4 clients which, at that point in time, were affected by the regulatory 
regime change, but (as those client portfolios were dominated by non-accelerated filers) were not 
as affected by Section 404 adoption.   As such, the results in G&P could be biased in favor of 
finding large fee increases for the Big 4 firms merely because a disproportionate number of Big 4 
clients had incurred 404(b) costs.  The current study differs from G&P in that the sample is 
restricted to include only the companies which complied with SOX 404, and were not in the 
initial year of SOX adoption (because the first year of SOX 404 compliance is associated with 
abnormally large fees, as found in Bhamornsiri et al., 2009).  This means that the vast majority 
of observations in the current study are from the years after 2004, which mitigates the bias 
resulting from the extraordinary high initial costs of implementing SOX 404(b).   
Griffin and Lont (2007) also investigate the impact of SOX on audit fees.  Their results 
show that audit fees have increased after the passage of SOX due to increased audit risk and 
increased audit effort, which is consistent with the claim that SOX led to increased fees by 
increasing auditor’s potential legal liability and requiring additional procedures.  They restrict 
their sample to only the Big 4 clients in their analysis, and as such do not investigate the Big 4 
versus non-Big 4 difference. 
Carson et al. (2012) investigate changes in the Big 4 fee premium over time and show 
that the premium has increased from the Big 6 period to the Big 5 and Big 4 periods using a 
sample of Australian firms from 1996-2007.  The current study differs from Carson et al. (2012) 
by focusing primarily on the post-SOX period and the US setting. 
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Hypothesis development  
There are two theoretical perspectives on why SOX would have a differential effect on 
the fee changes by the Big 4 versus non-Big4 firms, and they lead to opposite predictions.   
Investment in quality 
The first perspective centers on the argument that the Big 4 fee premium is driven by the 
decision/need to invest in higher quality auditing.  In accordance with this perspective, it is 
argued that the Big 4 have always provided higher quality audits than non-Big 4 firms (Lennox, 
1999).  Thus, SOX, which requires higher quality (and more expensive) audits, is predicted to 
have a relatively smaller effect on the fees of Big 4 firms than on the fees of non-Big 4 firms.   
For example: assume that prior to SOX, Big 4 firms were providing the market with audits of 
quality “X” and non-Big 4 firms were providing the market with audits of quality “Y”, where 
Y<X.  Then, assume that the PCAOB sets a new minimum audit quality standard of “Z” where 
Z>X>Y.  In this case, both the Big 4 firms and non-Big 4 firms will need to improve their quality 
levels.  However, the Big 4 will have to improve by a smaller amount as X is closer to Z than is 
Y.  Thus, if the level of improvement required by the Big 4 is, on average, less than that required 
by non-Big 4, it should require a smaller increase in effort and cost on the part of Big 4 firms.  
This, in turn, should lead to smaller fee increases for Big 4 than non-Big 4 firms after SOX.   
Along these lines, Choi et al (2008) studied the effect of a legal liability regime on audit 
fees internationally.  They argue that regardless of the regulatory regime, the Big 4 firms have 
greater resources at their disposal, and they are able to use these resources to engage in greater 
effort, presumably resulting in higher quality audits.  Simultaneously, the existence of greater 
resources also increases the likelihood that that these auditors will be viewed as a source of 
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“deep pockets” in case of an audit failure.  The heightened risk of litigation would provide a 
further incentive to provide high quality audit services.   
These two factors, in combination, lead to an expectation of high quality work on the part 
of the Big 4 audit firms even in the pre-SOX environment.  Under this line of argument, and 
consistent with Choi et al. (2008), the Big 4 are assumed to be conducting high quality audits 
under any regulatory regime.  Therefore there may have been relatively less need to change the 
level of effort in the post-SOX environment (i.e. relative to the changes required of the non-Big 4 
firms).  As such, under this perspective, the Big 4 are expected to have relatively smaller 
increases in audit fees in the post-SOX environment.        
With respect to non-Big 4 firms, this perspective also focuses on resources available to be 
deployed to perform high quality audits.  Specifically, non-Big 4 firms have fewer resources to 
invest in audits than the Big 4, which ceterus paribus would presumably lead to having lower 
audit quality than the Big 4.  Prior research provides evidence consistent with the claim that non-
Big 4 firms have lower audit quality (Lennox, 1999), and thus, a higher likelihood of an audit 
failure.  Once the regulatory regime changed, SOX increased legal liability and the threat of 
PCAOB inspections/sanctions created stricter audit requirements.  Under these new conditions, 
non-Big 4 firms had to make significant adjustments to increase the quality of their audits and 
reduce litigation risks.  This raises the possibility that in the post-SOX environment, non-Big 4 
firms had to significantly increase effort to perform higher quality work, which would lead to a 
significant increase in fees.  Several post-SOX papers confirm significant improvements in audit 
quality in second tier firms (Peltier, 2012; Boone et al., 2010).  Importantly, this perspective 
focuses on the presumptions that, while all firms would need to increase effort post-SOX, non-
Big 4 firms would be required to make a relatively greater increase in effort to achieve minimum 
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PCAOB expectations.  In essence, non-Big 4 firms are hypothesized to have relatively higher 
effort (and therefore fees) as they work to catch up to the enhanced quality expectations brought 
about by SOX.  This view suggests that non-Big 4 firms will increase the fees more than the Big 
4 after the passage of SOX.   
Market structure arguments 
The second theoretical view presents an opposing view.  This perspective is based more 
on arguments of market structure and the role that such structure has on competition and pricing.  
Here, the argument is based on the existence of a bifurcated market for audit services.  In one 
segment of the market, an oligopoly prevails whereas, in the other segment, producers face a 
more competitive structure.  As described below, these differences in market structure and 
competition have implications for the pricing (and the SOX-driven changes in pricing) of audit 
services.   
With respect to market structure, the upper-end of the audit market (the largest clients) is 
characterized as being dominated by the Big 4 firms, which audit 98% of the largest 1500 
companies in the US (US Treasury, 2008).  The market for smaller clients is not as highly 
concentrated.  The Big 4 audit approximately 22% of companies with sales of less than $100 
million, and 71% of the clients with sales between $100 million and $500 million (US Treasury, 
2008).  So, as suggested by Simunic (1980) and Ghosh and Lustgarten (2006), the audit market 
can be characterized as being comprised of two distinct segments: one more oligopolistic and the 
other more atomistic in nature.  The segment which consists of large clients is dominated by only 
four providers – the Big 4.  Thus it is oligopolistic.  The atomistic segment refers to the medium 
and especially the small client segment where there are many more audit firms and thus the Big 4 
– or any other provider – are likely to have less pricing power.   
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The economics of market structure posits that the firms in an oligopoly are price setters, 
as opposed to price takes (which would be the case in more competitive environments).  One of 
the main concerns related to the oligopolistic market structure is a possibility of collusion (Cox, 
2006).  Collusion can be explicit and implicit.  Explicit collusion “exists when firms directly 
negotiate production output and pricing agreements in order to reduce competition”, but such 
behavior is largely prohibited by anti-trust laws (Hoskisson et al., 2008, p. 195).  Implicit or tacit 
collusion “exists when several firms in an industry coordinate their production and pricing 
decisions by observance of each other’s competitive actions and responses”.  Tacit collusion is 
common in highly concentrated industries and assumes interdependence of firms (Hoskisson et 
al., 2008, p. 195).   
The oligopolistic segment of the audit market is highly concentrated (as noted earlier). 
Furthermore, one of the characteristics of this oligopolistic segment of the market is the 
interdependence of the Big 4 firms.  Examples of this interdependence are bidding for the same 
clients and recruiting the same talent from universities.  As such, the structure of the oligopolistic 
segment of the audit market fits the characteristics of an industry where tacit collusion can take 
place.  This is relevant to pricing because tacit collusion has been shown to lead to abnormally 
high prices (Hoskisson et al., 2008, p. 195).  This leads to an assumption that audit fees would be 
increasing at a higher rate in the oligopolistic segment of the market.  Further, since this segment 
is presumably dominated by price setting on the part of the Big 4 firms, fee increases would be 
higher for the Big 4 than non-Big 4 firms.   
Furthermore, SOX has changed the regulatory regime and increased legal liability of all 
accounting firms.  Associated potential legal liability costs are higher for the Big 4 firms because 
they have more resources to pay legal settlements. The Big 4 also have higher reputations at 
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stake in case of any audit failure (DeAngelo, 1981).  As such the Big 4 firms could be expected 
to increase their effort more than non-Big 4 to avoid any possible litigation; increased effort is 
expected to lead to increased audit fees.  As such, this view suggests that after the passage of 
SOX, the Big 4 would increase audit fees more than non-Big 4. 
Since there are two theoretical views on the differential impact of SOX on Big4 and non-
Big4 firms – investment in quality and market structure – I state my hypothesis in null form: 
H1: In the post-SOX environment there will be no significant difference in the rate 
of increase of audit fees between the Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms. 
Client Segments 
As noted previously, in addition to examining the relative differences in changes in fees 
between Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms, this paper also examines whether certain types of clients are 
driving those differences.  Specifically, I consider the likelihood that client size is an important 
factor in understanding the nature of changes in fee premium.  As in the previous section, I 
present two opposing theoretical perspectives which yield competing expectations.   
Consumer surplus 
“The excess of the price which he would be willing to pay rather than go without the 
thing, over that which he actually does pay, is the economic measure of this surplus 
satisfaction. It may be called consumer's surplus”  
(Marshall, 1890).  
  
Due to the fee negotiation process and imperfect information that the audit firm has about 
the client (the firm cannot objectively determine exactly how much a client would be willing to 
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pay), the firms do not always end up charging the maximum fees that the client would be willing 
to pay.  As such, consumer surplus, noted in the quote by Marshall above, exists in the audit 
market.  Specifically, this refers to the difference between the audit fee that a client would be 
willing to pay and the audit fee the client actually pays.     
If a client determines that its audit fee is too high, it is more likely to switch audit firms.  
This practice is more common for small clients due to their small size and low complexity 
(Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006).  For example, there is a large number of smaller registrants who 
do not need a Big 4 audit firm or even a regional accounting firm. Audits of small and simple 
clients can be performed by many local firms.  Thus, there is a greater number of firms that can 
reasonably be expected to compete for the business of such clients.  Furthermore, demands of 
small clients may be more price elastic, i.e., they are more sensitive to price increases because 
they have fewer resources.  Therefore such clients have more audit firm choices and may be 
more likely to search for a less costly alternative if the price is increasing. 
Here it is assumed that audit firms obtain consumer surplus by third degree price 
discrimination
3
, which “results when a firm sets a different price for different groups of 
                                                 
3
  Consumer surplus can be captured using price discrimination, which has four forms.  First 
degree price discrimination takes place in markets where the seller knows and is able to charge 
the maximum price that a consumer is willing to pay.  Second degree price discrimination takes 
place when a seller charges different prices for different quantities of products or services (e.g. 
charging less per unit when multiple units are purchased).  Third degree price discrimination 
refers to charging different customers different prices.  Finally, fourth degree price 
discrimination takes place where the seller charges all customers the same price, but costs of 
production are different (e.g. a movie theater charges the same price for tickets, however having 
accommodations for patrons in wheelchairs costs more to build).   
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customers” (Hirschey, 2008, p. 592)
4,5
.  Thus, it is assumed that these “groups of customers” in 
the audit market are clients that are grouped or characterized by demand elasticities.  As argued 
above, small clients are assumed to have more elastic demands than large clients.  Elasticity of 
demand refers to how responsive the quantity demanded is to the change in price of the product.  
Coincidentally, large clients have more resources to spare and thus are assumed to be more 
inelastic in their demand for audit services.  As such when the audit firm negotiates for a higher 
fee, large clients are more likely to be able to afford this increase than are the small clients.  So a 
large client may be more likely (relative to a smaller client) to be willing to accept a higher fee.  
Therefore, it is likely that large clients have more consumer surplus.  This leads to an expectation 
that audit firms will try to increase their revenues by targeting the surplus from large clients.  
This leads to a prediction that the large clients, which are primarily audited by the Big 4 firms, 
will experience significant fee increases.   
Client importance 
The second theoretical view in this section is based on the idea of client importance: 
firms are interested in keeping their large clients because a large portion of a firm’s revenue 
comes from such clients (Gul et al., 2007; Craswell et al., 2002).  Since SOX changed the 
regulatory regime and added a number of requirements which increased the firms’ liability 
exposure and effort, as noted earlier, audit firms will not keep their fee consistent with pre-SOX 
rates. There will be an increase in fees.  However, under this second line of reasoning, firms will 
be reluctant to increase fees for large clients because there is a risk that they will switch firms, 
                                                 
4
 This study focuses on fee changes as opposed to fee levels.  Thus the term third degree price 
discrimination is used to reference changing fees at a different rate for different groups of 
customers. 
5
 Audit firms are assumed to offer services of the same quality to all clients because audit firms 




which would lead to significant losses to an audit firm.  Given that audit firms are interested in 
keeping their large clients, but still need to increase their fees, this leads to the prediction that 
audit firms will have relatively greater fee increase for their small clients than for their large 
clients
6
.  This is consistent with the results in Carson et al. (2012) who also show that the 
premium increases in the Big 4 period have been lower for global clients.   
Since there are two theoretical views on the phenomenon I state my hypothesis in null 
form: 
H2: In the post-SOX environment there will be no significant difference between the 
rate of annual fee changes for large and small clients.  
Methods 
To test these two hypotheses, I use the following regression equation: 
∆FEE = β0+ β1BIG4 + β2CLIENTIMPORT + β 3CLIENTIMPORT*BIG4 + β 4∆SIZE +   
β5∆INVREC + β 6∆SEG + β 7∆ROA + β 8∆LEV + β 9LP + β 10PL + β 11FN + β 12NF +      
β 13EN + β 14NE + year fixed effects + ε              (1) 
Where: 
∆ = percentage change in the variable since prior year; 
FEE = audit fees; 
BIG4 = indicator variable coded 1 for a Big 4 firm and 0 otherwise; 
CLIENTIMPORT = audit fees paid by each client divided by the total audit fees received 
by the audit firm; 
SIZE = total assets; 
INVREC= inventory plus accounts receivable divided by total assets; 
                                                 
6
 This is also consistent with the client bargaining power argument, where large clients have 
greater bargaining power than small clients (Casterella et al., 2004). 
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SEG = total segments
7
; 
ROA = net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations divided by 
average total assets; 
LEV = total liabilities divided by total assets; 
LP = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which had a loss in the prior year but did 
not have a loss in the current year; 
PL = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which had a loss in the current year but 
did not have a loss in the prior year;  
FN = indicator variable coded 1 for companies that paid foreign tax in the prior year but 
did not pay it in the current year; 
NF = indicator variable coded 1 for companies that did not pay foreign tax in the prior 
year but paid foreign tax in the current year; 
EN = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which had effective internal controls in 
the current year and had ineffective controls in the prior year;  
NE = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which had ineffective controls in the prior 
year and had effective controls in the current year; 
Fixed effects = year indicator variables. 
BIG4 is the independent variable used to test H1, since competing theoretical views are 
provided I do not predict the sign of β1.  A positive coefficient on BIG4 would be consistent with 
the oligopolistic structure of the market for the services of the Big 4 firms, where the firms have 
more pricing power, and this can increase their prices.  A negative coefficient on Big 4 would be 
consistent with the investment in quality argument where non-Big 4 firms had to make more 
substantial changes in their audit efforts after SOX as compared to the Big 4.  
CLIENTIMPORT is the independent variable used to test H2.  Because competing 
theoretical views are presented, I do not provide a prediction on the sign of β2. A positive 
coefficient would be consistent with the consumer surplus theoretical view, where audit firms 
                                                 
7
 I assigned the value of 1 to all cases where segment data were missing, which is consistent with 
Francis and (2009) and Choi et al. (2012) 
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capture the consumer surplus of their largest clients, who have more resources.  On the other 
hand, a negative coefficient would support the client importance view, where the firms do not 
increase the fees of their large clients for fear of losing them. 
SIZE is included in the model and has been shown to be the primary driver of audit fees.   
The expected sign for SIZE is positive (Simunic, 1980; Francis et al., 2005; Choi et al., 2010; 
Charles et al., 2010).  SEG and FN (NF) are included to proxy for the complexity of a client.  
Clients with multiple segments require more audit effort, thus the expected coefficient of SEG is 
positive.  Clients with foreign operations also require additional audit effort.  As such, if a 
company goes from not having foreign operations to having them (NF), the complexity of the 
company increases, thus the expected coefficient of NF is positive.  Consequently, the expected 
coefficient of FN (i.e. a change from having foreign operations to not having foreign operations) 
is negative (Choi et al., 2010; Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006; Simunic, 1980).   
Following prior research, INVREC, ROA, LEV, LP (PL), NE (EN) are included as 
proxies for client risk.  Inventories and receivables are considered high risk items; highly 
leveraged clients are also considered to be risky, thus they require more audit effort. Therefore, 
the expected coefficients on INVREC  and LEV are positive (Choi et al., 2010; Ghosh and 
Pawlewicz, 2009).  Profitable clients have lower risk.  Thus, expected coefficients on ROA and 
LP (a year with a loss followed by a year with no loss) are negative, and the expected coefficient 
on PL (year with no loss followed by a year with a loss) is positive (Ghosh and Lustgarten, 
2006).  Finally, clients with ineffective internal controls are risky.  Furthermore audit firms have 
to perform additional procedures to address internal control deficiencies. Therefore, the expected 
coefficient on EN (a year with effective controls followed by a year with ineffective controls) is 





Sample, descriptive statistics and univariate tests. 
Audit fee data was obtained from Audit Analytics and financial data was obtained from 
Compustat.  The sample excludes observations that: 
1) have less than two consecutive years of fee or control variable data, since that is 
required to perform a change analysis. 
2) do not comply with Section 404(b).  Compliance has been one of the two main 
sources of fee increases after SOX, and including the companies that do not comply 
potentially biases the results. 
3) are in the first year of 404(b) compliance, because the fees are disproportionally 
higher in the first year of compliance (Bhamornsiri et al.,2009). 
4) represent initial audit engagements, because prior research found lowballing in first 
year engagements (Francis, 1984; Francis and Simon, 1987). 




The final sample includes observations from fiscal years 2005-2011.  Earlier years are not 
included due to the fact that SOX 404(b) compliance became mandatory starting in 2004 for 
large accelerated and accelerated filers, and I exclude first year of compliance due to 
disproportionally higher fees in the first year of compliance (Bhamornsiri et al.,2009). 
Descriptive statistics and univariate tests are included in Table 1.  All variables are 




 percentiles.  The final sample consists of 17,890 observations, 
                                                 
8
 While non US companies were affected by SOX (multinationals, subsidiaries), enhancing 
practices worldwide, it is not clear when the changes took place or the extent to which the 
changes occurred uniformly.  Thus, non-US firms were excluded in an attempt to reduce 
nonsystematic variation.   
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15,060 are Big 4 clients and 2,830 are non-Big 4 clients.  Average annual change in audit fees is 
4.8% in the overall sample, 4.2% for the Big 4 clients and 7.6% for non-Big 4 clients.  
Univariate tests show that non-Big 4 clients have experienced significantly higher fee changes 
than the Big4.  The mean ratio of fees received from each client to the total received by each firm 
is 1.1% with significant differences between the Big 4 (less than 1%) and non-Big 4 firms 
(6.5%).  These differences are primarily driven by the portfolio sizes of the Big 4 and non-Big 4 
firms.  The Big 4 firms have hundreds of clients, and as such, on average, fees received from 
each client amount to a smaller fraction of the total portfolio.  On the other hand, small firms 
may have only a few public clients. Consequently each client would be a relatively large portion 
of the portfolio.   
Table 2 presents a correlation matrix.  There is a significant negative association between 
CLIENTIMPORT and BIG4 (rho=-0.49).  There is also a correlation of 0.28 between FEE and 
SIZE, a 0.26 correlation between BIG4 and CLIENTIMPORT*BIG4 interaction, a -0.25 
correlation between ROA and LP, as well as a -0.39 correlation between ROA and PL.  However 
beyond these associations, no other correlations exceeded 0.17.  Further, subsequent analyses do 
not indicate that multicollinearity poses a significant problem, as none of the variance inflation 
factors (VIF) exceeded the threshold of 10 (the highest VIF was 3.95).   
Multivariate results. 
Results of a pooled cross sectional OLS regression are presented in Table 3.  The 
regression equation is estimated using robust standard errors and clustering by company.  Recall 
that Hypothesis 1 focuses on the differences in the rate of increase of audit fees between the Big 
4 and non-Big 4 firms.  The coefficient of BIG4 is significantly negative (t= -4.30), and as such, 
null hypothesis 1 is rejected.  This result indicates that in the post-SOX environment, non-Big 4 
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firms have been increasing their fees at a higher rate than the Big 4 firms, which is consistent 
with the proposition that the Big 4 fee premium has been diminishing.  Specifically, the results 
suggest that when SOX created higher quality control standards for audits, non-Big 4 firms had 
to make more significant adjustments to comply with the new requirements than the Big 4.  
These adjustments meant more effort, and thus higher fees charged by the non-Big 4 firms.        
The purpose of hypothesis 2 is to investigate whether the small or the large clients (as 
compared to other companies in the firm’s portfolio) drive the annual fee changes. The 
coefficient of CLIENTIMPORT is significantly positive (t=3.42).  Thus null hypothesis 2 is 
rejected.  This suggests that the annual change in audit fees is driven primarily by firms’ largest 
clients.  This is consistent with the consumer surplus theoretical argument presented in the theory 
section: audit firms seem to increase fees by capturing consumer surplus from their largest 
clients, who have the most resources.  The interaction between client size and the Big 4 is 
significantly positive (t=6.16), which indicates that the effect of client size is more pronounced 
for the Big 4 firms. 
Most control variables are also significant in the predicted direction.  Change in audit 
fees is positively associated with the increase in company’s assets, the increase in the ratio of 
inventory and receivables to total assets, and an increase in leverage.  The fees also increase 
when a company goes from a profitable year to reporting a loss and from not having foreign 
operations to having them.   Audit fees decrease when a company goes from having a loss to 




I re-estimated the model using two different client size measures: total fees (audit plus 
non-audit) received from the client as a percentage of total fees received by the firm and non-
audit fee from the client divided by total fees received by the firm, which is consistent with Gul 
et al. (2007) and Lim and Tan (2010).  As noted earlier, the two theoretical views on the 
relationship between client size and annual change in audit fees are related to dependency on the 
client or consumer surplus.  Prior research used non-audit fees as measures of auditor 
independence, or how much a firm is dependent on a client (Gul et al., 2007).  Non-audit fees 
can also be used as a measure of a client’s consumer surplus because large clients with a lot of 
resources and thus more consumer surplus, can afford more non-audit services.  Results 
(untabulated) using these two non-audit fee measures are qualitatively the same.   
Prior research has suggested that audit firm tenure can be a driver of audit fees.  If a 
company has been audited by the same firm for a number of years, the auditor is likely to have a 
very good understanding of the company, which would lead to efficiencies in the audit prices and 
therefore, lower audit fees.  Consequently if the audit firm is new, the auditors are assumed to be 
familiarizing themselves with their client, which could lead to inefficiencies in audit procedures 
and thus higher fees.  On the other hand if a client-auditor relationship is long, the audit firm can 
potentially use that as leverage in negotiating a higher fee.  In order to address the impact of the 
auditor tenure on the annual audit fee changes I re-estimate regression equation 1 with four 
different measures of audit tenure (as used by Gul et al., 2007; Lim and Tan, 2010): the number 
of years with the current audit firm, natural log of the number of years, dummy variable coded 
one if tenure is three years or less and zero otherwise, two dummy variables (tenure is three years 
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or less, and nine years or more).  Most tenure variables are significant, and the results for both 
BIG4 and CLIENTIMPORT (untabulated) remain qualitatively the same.    
As noted earlier, the Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms have very different sizes of client 
portfolios.  As such, I re-estimate the model separately for Big 4 and non-Big 4 clients.  The 
results (untabulated) show that CLIENTIMPORT is significant in both sub-samples: t=4.94 for 
the Big 4 clients and t=3.28 for non-Big 4 clients.  I also re-estimated the model excluding one 
year at a time to see if the results are driven by only one year. The results remained qualitatively 
the same.   
  Since BIG4 and CLIENTIMPORT are relatively highly correlated (-0.4885), I re-
estimate the model using a different measure of client size.  Instead of using a continuous 
variable for client size, I use quintiles.  I created four dummy variables for quintiles five through 
two and re-estimated the regression equation as follows: 
∆FEE = β0+ β 1BIG4 + β 2 Q5 + β 3Q4 + β 4Q3 + β 5Q2 + β 6Q5*BIG4 + β 7Q4*BIG4 +   
β8 Q3*BIG4+ β 9Q2*BIG4 + β 10∆SIZE + β 11∆INVREC + β 12∆SEG + β 13∆ROA +         
β 14∆LEV + β 15LP + β 16PL + β 17FN + β 18NF + β 19EN + β 20NE + year fixed effects + ε  
                                    (2) 
Q5, Q4, Q3, Q2 refer to dummy variables representing quintiles five (Q5) through two 
(Q2); quintiles are based on the size of the client in the audit firm’s portfolio each year.  Quintile 
5 has the largest clients (as compared to other companies in the portfolio of each audit firm in a 
given year), and quintile 1 has the smallest.  If a firm had less than 5 clients in a given year, the 
largest client is assigned to quintile 5, second largest is assigned to quintile 4, etc.  All other 
variables are as previously defined..   
Interaction variables in the model had VIF’s over the threshold of 10 suggesting 
multicollinearity problems.  Consequently, I re-estimated the model without the interaction 
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variables.  The coefficient on BIG4 remains significantly negative (t=-4.68), and coefficients on 
quintiles five, four and three are significantly positive (t values of 7.81, 6.50, and 2.46 
respectively.  Further, coefficients on quintiles of five, four, and three are 0.0423, 0.0369, 0.0132 
respectively).  I also re-estimated the regression equation after excluding all firms which did not 
have at least five clients in their audit portfolios.  The results remained qualitatively the same.  
As such, using quintile dummies for client size does not change the results which show a 
diminishing Big 4 premium in the post-SOX environment and higher annual audit fee changes 
for the large clients.  
The PCAOB Effect 
This study is focused on the post-SOX period.  Theoretical arguments presented earlier 
are based on the assertion that SOX has changed the regulatory environment.  As argued in the 
theory section SOX created a regulatory regime change, primarily driven by the creation of the 
PCAOB.  As such the passage of SOX itself might not have directly changed the regulatory 
regime, but did so indirectly through the PCAOB inspections.  In order to test this notion I 
conduct an event study using the following equation: 
∆FEE = β0+ β1BIGN+ β2PCAOB+ β3BIGN*PCAOB+ β4CLIENTIMPORT + 
β5CLIENTIMPORT*BIGN + β 6∆SIZE + β7∆INVREC + β 8∆ROA + β 9∆LEV + β 10LP + 
β 11PL + β 12FN + β 13NF + β 14 INITIAL404B + β 15NEWAUD + β 16CRISIS + ε         (3) 
Where:  
BIGN = indicator variable coded 1 for a Big 5 firm (since Arthur Andersen was still in existence 
before 2002) and 0 otherwise; 
PCAOB = indicator variable coded 1 if fiscal year end is after 2002 and a company is audited by 
a Big 4 firm or if fiscal year is after 2003 and a company is audited by a non-Big 4 firm;
 9
   
                                                 
9 I have also re-estimated Equation 3 replacing the variable PCAOB with SOX, which was coded 
1 for all years after 2001; this was done to analyze the effect of the passage of the Act itself on 
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INITIAL404B = indicator variable coded 1 if the observation represents a company that had 
undergone its initial 404(b) engagement in that year and 0 otherwise; 
NEWAUD = indicator variable coded 1 if the observation represents the first year of the auditor-
client relationship and 0 otherwise; 
CRISIS = 1 if the years are 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise.  Since PCAOB controls for the years 
after 2002 or 2003 (depending on the size of the auditor) I do not include year fixed effects to 
avoid over specifying the model.  Instead I am adding this variable to control for the effects of 
the global financial crisis. 
Variables CLIENTIMPORT, SIZE, INVREC, ROA, LEV, LP, PL, FN, NF were described in 
Equation 1. 
The reason for the difference in the Big 4 and non-Big 4 coding of the variable PCAOB 
is driven by the fact that the PCAOB conducted its very first inspections in 2003, but in that year, 
the PCAOB inspected only the Big 4 firms.  Inspections for non-Big 4 firms started in 2004.  As 
such, it is likely that the effect of the regulatory change caused by the PCAOB inspections 
affected the Big 4 and non-Big 4 at different times
10
.  Since I am primarily interested in the 
differential impact of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (through the PCAOB regulatory inspections) on 
the fees charged by the Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms, my main variable of interest in Equation 3 is 
the interaction between BIGN and PCAOB.  A positive coefficient would be consistent with the 
                                                                                                                                                             
the rate of change of audit fees.  Interaction between BIGN and SOX was highly correlated with 
main effects (VIF’s over 10); therefore Equation 3 was re-estimated using mean-centered BIGN 
and SOX.  The results (untabulated) were qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 5.  
However, it is important to note that one of the limitations of investigating audit fees before and 
after SOX is the fact that fee disclosure data is available for only a limited time in the pre-SOX 
period.       
 
10
 Per review of the PCAOB inspection reports on the PCAOB.org website, the reports in 2003 
were titled “Limited Inspection”, and the reports starting in 2004 no longer indicated that they 
were “limited”.  Consequently it is possible that the full effect of the PCAOB inspection reports 
did not start until the reports were no longer limited.  This means that the effect would start in 
2004 for the Big 4 as well as non-Big 4.  I re-estimated Equation 3 coding PCAOB 1 for the 
years after 2003 for both the Big 4 and non-Big 4. The results (untabulated) for BIGN and 




assertion that after the PCAOB started conducting its inspections, the Big 4 firms further 
increased their fee premium, which would be consistent with the assertion that the Big 4 
potentially strengthened their oligopolistic powers in the post-SOX environment.  On the other 
hand, a negative coefficient would indicate that the PACOB inspections increased the fees of the 
non-Big 4 firms, which would be consistent with the investment in quality argument.   
CRISIS is included in the model to control for the years of the global financial crisis 
(2007-2009).  Anecdotal evidence suggests that the financial crisis put a significant downward 
pressure on the audit fees regardless of the size of the audit firm, because the firms had to be 
responsive to the financial difficulties faced by the clients.    
The sample used to test Equation 3 consists of 49,603 observations from 2000-2011.  
Audit fee data were not generally publicly reported and therefore are unavailable in Audit 
Analytics before 2000.  The results are presented in Table 5.  The coefficients of 
CLIENTIMPORT and CLIENTIMPORT*BIGN are both significantly positive.  These findings 
are consistent with the results in the main analysis section and provide additional evidence 
indicating that the changes in audit fees are driven primarily by the large clients.  The significant 
interaction suggests that this finding is more evident for the Big 4 firms.  This further provides 
support for the consumer surplus theoretical reasoning. 
The coefficient on BIGN is significantly positive (t=8.81), which indicates that during the 
2000-2011 sample period, which includes pre-SOX as well as post-SOX, the Big N firms have 
increased their fees are a higher rate than non-Big N firms.  This finding seems inconsistent with 
the primary findings presented in Tables 3 and 4.  However, the primary analysis examines data 
from 2005-2011.  Thus the difference in findings is likely driven by the difference in sample 
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periods.  Evidence supporting this assertion is provided by the significantly negative coefficient 
on the BIGN*PCAOB variable.  I also re-estimated the model separately for 2000-2004 and 
2005-2011 periods. The coefficient on BIGN was significantly positive in the 2000-2004 period 
and significantly negative in the 2005-2011 period. This finding suggests that in the period 
subsequent to the initiation of the PCAOB inspections, clients of non-Big 4 firms have 
experienced greater fee increases.  Thus these findings are consistent with the primary analysis 
and supporting of the “investment in quality” perspective, where non-Big 4 firms had to make 
significant improvements in their audit procedures to comply with new auditing requirements.     
Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper is two-fold.  First, I investigate the changes in the Big 4 fee 
premium after the passage of SOX.  Second, I investigate whether annual audit fee changes 
differ based on the size of the client relative to the remainder of the audit firm’s portfolio.  The 
results show that, in the post SOX environment, clients of non-Big 4 firms have experienced 
larger annual audit fee increases than the clients of the Big 4 firms.  This suggests that the Big 4 
fee premium has diminished after SOX.  This is consistent with the investment in quality 
theoretical view: even in the pre-SOX environment, the Big 4 had more resources to invest in 
their audits; they can also be viewed as sources of “deep pockets” in litigations.  As such the Big 
4 are expected to perform high quality audits regardless of the regulatory regime.  On the other 
hand non-Big 4 have fewer resources to invest in audits, which could lead in lower quality 
audits, as compared to the Big 4. Thus, in the post-SOX environment, when legal liability and 
regulatory scrutiny was increased, the non-Big 4 had to make a larger adjustment to their audits 
than the Big 4 in order to comply with new requirements.  Therefore non-Big 4 firms had to 
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increase their effort (and subsequently the fees that they charge their clients) relatively more than 
the Big 4.  This extends the work by Ghosh and Pawlewicz (2009) and Grifin and Lont (2007) by 
investigating the Big 4 fee premium in the post-SOX environment.  This finding contributes to 
our understanding of the impact of a major change in the regulatory regime on audit fees. 
I also find that audit fee increases are driven primarily by the large clients in the audit 
firm portfolio.  This is consistent with the consumer surplus theoretical argument: large 
companies have more financial resources and their demands for audit services are less elastic.  
Small clients are presumably more likely to switch audit firms if the firm increases the fees 
because such clients have less financial resources (and therefore less consumer surplus) and 
consequently more elastic demands.  Therefore if an audit firm increases their fees, large clients 
are more likely to agree to pay such fees than smaller companies.  This finding suggests that 
audit firms are able to increase their fees by capturing consumer surplus from their large clients.  
This result contributes to our understanding of the economics of the fee competition in the audit 
industry.  This study also extends the work by Ghosh and Lustgarten (2006) by investigating 










Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics – Market Segmentation and Premium Pricing  
  Full Sample Big 4 Non Big 4   









FEE    
         
0.0476 
      
0.2574 
   
0.0423 0.2512 
                                    
0.0758 0.2865 -0.0335*** 
BIG4 0.8418 0.3649 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
CLIENTIMPORT  0.0111 0.0476 0.0010 0.0019 0.0647 0.1044 -0.0638*** 
CLIENTIMPORT  
*BIG4 0.0008 0.0013 0.0009 0.0013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009*** 
SIZE 0.0936 0.2728 0.0911 0.2664 0.1070 0.3043 -0.0159*** 
INVREC 0.0372 0.3313 0.0365 0.3243 0.0405 0.3663 -0.0039** 
SEG 0.0599 0.4358 0.0703 0.4488 0.0049 0.3542 0.0653*** 
ROA -0.3148 3.1534 -0.2940 3.1413 -0.4256 3.2157 0.1316** 
LEV 0.0445 0.2629 0.0430 0.2525 0.0524 0.3121 -0.0095** 
LP 0.0783 0.2686 0.0787 0.2693 0.0760 0.2650 0.0027 
PL 0.0932 0.2908 0.0901 0.2863 0.1099 0.3128 -0.0198*** 
FN 0.0076 0.0869 0.0074 0.0855 0.0088 0.0936 -0.0015 
NF 0.0204 0.1414 0.0200 0.1400 0.0226 0.1487 -0.0026 
EN 0.0233 0.1509 0.0218 0.1462 0.0311 0.1736 -0.0092*** 
NE 0.0363 0.1871 0.0334 0.1797 0.0519 0.2220 -0.0185*** 
FEE = percentage change of audit fees; 
BIG4 = indicator variable coded 1 for a Big 4 firm and 0 otherwise; 
CLIENTIMPORT  = assets of each client divided by the total assets audited by each firm; 
SIZE = percentage change of total assets; 
INVREC= percentage change of inventory plus accounts receivable divided by total assets; 
SEG = percentage change of total segments; 
ROA = percentage change of net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations divided by average 
total assets; 
LEV = percentage change of total liabilities divided by total assets; 
LP = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which had a loss in the prior year but did not have a loss in the 
current year; 
PL = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which had loss in the current year but did not have a loss in the prior 
year;  
FN = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which paid foreign tax in the prior year but did not pay it in the 
current year; 
NF = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which did not pay foreign tax in the prior year but paid foreign tax in 
the current year; 
EN = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which had effective internal controls in the current year and had 
ineffective controls in the prior year;  
NE = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which had ineffective controls in the prior year and had effective 
controls in the current year; 
*, **, ***- Indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level in a two-tailed t-test respectively. 
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         FEE 1 
       BIG4 -0.0475 1 
      CLIENTIMPORT 0.0551 -0.4885 1 
     CLIENTIMPORT
*BIG4 0.0168 0.2635 -0.0975 1 
    SIZE 0.2839 -0.0213 0.0256 -0.0263 1 
   INVREC 0.0187 -0.0043 0.0083 -0.0363 -0.1409 1 
  SEG 0.1010 0.0547 -0.0245 -0.0020 0.0886 0.0308 1 
 ROA -0.0054 0.0152 -0.0061 0.0027 0.0349 -0.0235 0.0079 
 LEV 0.1088 -0.0132 0.0150  -0.0446 0.0685 0.1727 0.0306 
 LP -0.0454 0.0037 -0.0135 -0.0097 0.0191 0.0012 -0.0437 
 PL 0.0384 -0.0248 0.0034 -0.0223 -0.1109 0.0229 -0.0161 
 FN -0.0158 -0.0061 0.0041 -0.0106 -0.0242 0.024 -0.0020 
 NF 0.0455 -0.0068 -0.0099 -0.0315 0.0883 0.0279 0.0191 
 NE -0.0140 -0.0362 0.0144 0.0008 -0.0268 0.0124 0.0861 
 EN 0.1325 -0.0224 0.0039 -0.0127 0.0170 0.0023 0.0510 
 
         
 
ROA LEV LP PL FN NF NE EN 
ROA 1 
       LEV -0.0266 1 
      LP -0.2507 -0.0946 1 
     PL -0.3959 0.0976 -0.0934 1 
    FN -0.0022 0.0168 0.0080 0.0206 1 
   NF -0.0057 0.0472 0.0183 -0.0014 -0.0126 1 
  NE -0.0033 0.0077 0.0124 0.0240 0.0243 0.0037 1 
 EN -0.0223 0.0283 -0.0023 0.0715 0.0078 0.0065 -0.0300 1 
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FEE = percentage change of audit fees; 
BIG4 = indicator variable coded 1 for a Big 4 firm and 0 otherwise; 
CLIENTIMPORT  = assets of each client divided by the total assets audited by each firm; 
SIZE = percentage change of total assets; 
INVREC= percentage change of inventory plus accounts receivable divided by total assets; 
SEG = percentage change of total segments; 
ROA = percentage change of net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations divided by average 
total assets; 
LEV = percentage change of total liabilities divided by total assets; 
LP = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which had a loss in the prior year but did not have a loss in the 
current year; 
PL = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which had loss in the current year but did not have a loss in the prior 
year;  
FN = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which paid foreign tax in the prior year but did not pay it in the 
current year; 
NF = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which did not pay foreign tax in the prior year but paid foreign tax in 
the current year; 
EN = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which had effective internal controls in the current year and had 
ineffective controls in the prior year;  
NE = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which had ineffective controls in the prior year and had effective 















Table 3 - Multivariate Results Using a Continuous Measure of Client Importance 
FEE Coefficient t-statistic 
BIG4 -0.0253 -4.30*** 
CLIENTIMPORT  0.1828 3.42*** 
CLIENTIMPORT 
*BIG4 9.4025 6.16*** 
SIZE 0.2581 23.26*** 
INVREC 0.0314 4.34*** 
SEG 0.0115 1.42 
ROA 0.0003 0.47 
LEV 0.0618 6.41*** 
LP -0.0215 -3.09*** 
PL 0.0532 6.77*** 
FN -0.0347 -1.90* 
NF 0.0300 1.95* 
EN 0.1920 9.25*** 
NE -0.0237 -1.76 
Constant 0.0445 3.97*** 




FEE = percentage change of audit fees; 
BIG4 = indicator variable coded 1 for a Big 4 firm and 0 otherwise; 
CLIENTIMPORT  = assets of each client divided by the total assets audited by each firm; 
SIZE = percentage change of total assets; 
INVREC= percentage change of inventory plus accounts receivable divided by total assets; 
SEG = percentage change of total segments; 
ROA = percentage change of net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations divided by average 
total assets; 
LEV = percentage change of total liabilities divided by total assets; 
LP = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which had a loss in the prior year but did not have a loss in the 
current year; 
PL = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which had loss in the current year but did not have a loss in the prior 
year;  
FN = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which paid foreign tax in the prior year but did not pay it in the 
current year; 
NF = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which did not pay foreign tax in the prior year but paid foreign tax in 
the current year; 
EN = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which had effective internal controls in the current year and had 
ineffective controls in the prior year;  
NE = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which had ineffective controls in the prior year and had effective 
controls in the current year. 




Table 4 - Multivariate Results Using Indicator Variables for Client Importance 
FEE Coefficient t-statistic 
BIG4 -0.0242 -4.68*** 
Q5 0.0423 7.81*** 
Q4 0.0369 6.50*** 
Q3 0.0132 2.46** 
Q2 0.0027 0.51 
SIZE 0.2567 23.33*** 
INVREC 0.0326 4.53*** 
SEG 0.0103 1.27 
ROA 0.0003 0.37 
LEV 0.0635 6.59*** 
LP -0.0231 -3.32*** 
PL 0.0513 6.56*** 
FN -0.0354 -1.95* 
NF 0.0308 2.01** 
EN 0.1894 9.18*** 
NE -0.0261 -1.93* 
Constant -0.0097 2.97*** 




FEE = percentage change of audit fees; 
BIG4 = indicator variable coded 1 for a Big 4 firm and 0 otherwise; 
Q5 = indicator variable coded 1 if a company is in the fifth quintile; 
Q4 = indicator variable coded 1 if a company is in the fourth quintile; 
Q3 = indicator variable coded 1 if a company is in the third quintile; 
Q2 = indicator variable coded 1 if a company is in the second quintile;  
SIZE = percentage change of total assets; 
INVREC= percentage change of inventory plus accounts receivable divided by total assets; 
SEG = percentage change of total segments; 
ROA = percentage change of net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations divided by average 
total assets; 
LEV = percentage change of total liabilities divided by total assets; 
LP = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which had a loss in the prior year but did not have a loss in the 
current year; 
PL = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which had loss in the current year but did not have a loss in the prior 
year;  
FN = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which paid foreign tax in the prior year but did not pay it in the 
current year; 
NF = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which did not pay foreign tax in the prior year but paid foreign tax in 
the current year; 
EN = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which had effective internal controls in the current year and had 
ineffective controls in the prior year;  
NE = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which had ineffective controls in the prior year and had effective 
controls in the current year. 




Table 5 – Impact of the PCAOB  
FEE     Coefficient t-statistic 
BIGN 0.1029 8.81*** 
PCAOB 0.0238 2.14** 
BIGN*PCAOB -0.0537 -4.15*** 
CLIENTIMPORT  0.0398 2.32** 
CLIENTIMPORT 
*BIGN 10.9268 3.70*** 
SIZE 0.3107 27.86*** 
INVREC 0.0300 5.06*** 
ROA 0.0018 1.95* 
LEV 0.0535 7.81*** 
LP -0.0483 -5.12*** 
PL 0.0843 7.90*** 
FN 0.0164 0.61 
NF 0.0814 3.42*** 
INITIAL404B 0.8391 51.21*** 
NEWAUD -0.0163 -1.18 
CRISIS -0.1429 -27.32*** 
Constant 0.0963 9.54*** 




FEE = percentage change of audit fees; 
BIGN = indicator variable coded 1 for a Big 5 firm and 0 otherwise; 
PCAOB = indicator variable coded 1 if fiscal year end is after 2002 and a company is audited by a Big 4 firm or if 
fiscal year is after 2003 and a company is audited by a non-Big 4 firm;   
CLIENTIMPORT  = assets of each client divided by the total assets audited by each firm; 
SIZE = percentage change of total assets; 
INVREC= percentage change of inventory plus accounts receivable divided by total assets; 
ROA = percentage change of net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations divided by average 
total assets; 
LEV = percentage change of total liabilities divided by total assets; 
LP = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which had a loss in the prior year but did not have a loss in the 
current year; 
PL = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which had loss in the current year but did not have a loss in the prior 
year;  
FN = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which paid foreign tax in the prior year but did not pay it in the 
current year; 
NF = indicator variable coded 1 for companies which did not pay foreign tax in the prior year but paid foreign tax in 
the current year; 
INITIAL404B = indicator variable coded 1 if the company had an internal control assessment done by external 
auditors for the first time; 
NEWAUD = indicator variable coded 1 if represents the first year of the auditor-client relationship and 0 otherwise; 
CRISIS = 1 if the years are 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise. 
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REGULATORY DEBATE ON AUDIT MARKET COMPETITION, AUDIT 
QUALITY AND AUDIT FEES: AN INTERNATIONAL EXAMINATION 
Introduction 
This study is focused on three main areas: 1) the relationship between audit fees and audit 
market concentration on a country level; 2) the effect of a country’s litigation regime on the 
relationship between audit fees and market concentration and 3) the inter-relations between 
competition, fees, and quality in the market for audit services.  The study is motivated by the 
current debate in the United States and the European Union about the possible problems 
associated with the current oligopolistic structure of the audit market.  The audit market can be 
characterized as an oligopoly dominated by the four largest accounting firms – the Big 4.  Based 
on global revenues, the smallest of the Big 4 firms is approximately four times bigger than the 
fifth largest audit firm. Absent regulatory intervention, the possibility of another accounting firm 
challenging the status quo (and changing the market to the Big 5) is highly unlikely.  Thus, to the 
extent that an oligopoly structure can lead to higher fees and/or lower quality, having such a 
market structure is of regulatory concern.   
Suppliers in an oligopoly, under the right conditions, can become price setters as opposed 
to price takers. Specifically, given the limited number of competitors, the oligopolistic structure 
can lead to collusion (most likely implicit, since explicit collusion is prohibited by law) among 
major suppliers who can tacitly agree to set higher fees and earn abnormal profits at the expense 
of the buyers.  Reducing competition by collusion also has the potential to reduce the motivation 
to perform high quality services. Thus such market structure has potentially important 
implications for the fees that these providers charge and the quality of service they offer. 
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On the other hand, audit firms in more concentrated markets may be able to take 
advantage of the economies of scale.  Some costs that the firms incur are fixed, e.g. technology, 
administrative, and training, and if a firm is able to generate more output, fixed costs per unit of 
output would be lower.  Such savings could be passed down to the clients in the form of charging 
lower fees.  From this standpoint, concentrated markets would be associated with lower fees.   
Governmental institutions around the world have ordered analyses of the audit market, 
and resulting reports have voiced concerns over the highly concentrated nature of the audit 
market and insufficient choice of an auditor.  Such reports have been based on the analysis of 
either one country only (the US, the UK) or a regional group of countries (European Union); 
however no report has analyzed the audit market globally.  Thus, these studies provide a limited 
view. Major audit clients are multinational entities and audit firm networks are increasingly 
global in scope: each of the Big 4 firms has offices in over 140 countries.  Therefore the 
international aspect of the audit firm competition cannot be ignored.  The importance of this 
study lies in the fact that it provides a multi-national empirical investigation of the audit 
competition-fee relationship, an examination of how country-level fee affects the competition-
quality relationship, while controlling for country-level factors.   
Results show a negative relationship between country-level market concentration and 
audit fees but only in highly litigious countries, suggesting that the firms are able to obtain 
economies of scale in more concentrated markets and are willing to pass savings down to their 
clients.  However this relationship only holds for the clients of the Big N firms.  Analysis of 
audit quality suggests that audit quality is higher in more concentrated markets but mediation 
analysis did not show that the fees mediate the relationship between audit quality and market 
concentration.   
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This study contributes to research and regulation.  This is the first study which analyzes 
how the relationship between audit market competition and audit fees is impacted by the 
litigation regime.  This is also the first study to examine how the relationship between audit fees 
and audit quality is affected by competition internationally.  Furthermore, prior research has not 
addressed the interrelationships between the audit fees, competition, and quality.  Results from 
this study can also inform regulatory bodies:  The US Treasury Department, the House of Lords, 
and the International Federation of Accountants have expressed concerns about the effects the 
current audit market structure has on the audit prices and quality of services provided (US 
Treasury, 2008; House of Lords, 2010.a; European Commission, 2010).   
Background 
Structure of the Audit Market 
“The large public company audit market is a tight oligopoly” dominated by the Big 4 
audit firms (GAO, 2003, p.22).  This was also the case when the market was dominated by the 
Big 5, the Big 6, or the Big 8.  In the United States, and most of the countries in the European 
Union, the Big 4 audit approximately 90% of the public companies. Such high levels of 
concentration are a clear sign of an oligopoly.  The Big 4 dominance is even more evident in the 
large company market: in the US, 98% of the largest 1,500 companies are audited by the Big 4 
(US Treasury, 2008).  While the dominance in the smaller company market is not as strong, there 
is a big gap between the Big 4 and next tier of accounting firms: BDO, McGladrey and Grant 
Thornton
11
.  Each of the Big 4 firms posted global revenues of over $20 billion in 2011, the next 
                                                 
11
 Based on the evidence from the US, the Big 4 dominance in the small firm market has been 
decreasing in the 2000’s.  The Big 4 audited 22% of the clients with who had under $100 million 
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largest firm, BDO, had less than $6 billion worldwide (based on the disclosures on the websites 
of the firms).  As such, currently, no other accounting firm can truly challenge any of the Big 4.     
There are several reasons for such Big 4 dominance. In general, they relate to economies 
of scale.  Audits of the largest companies require large staff with a global presence and a widely 
diverse skillset.  Frequently over a hundred auditors are involved in an audit of a single large 
client.  Smaller accounting firms are unlikely to have the breadth or depth of skilled staff, or the 
internal and global infrastructure to conduct such an engagement.  The internationalization of 
business and the resulting internationalization of the audit market require significant resources to 
be a prominent player, which again is another reason only a few very large firms can afford such 
an investment. 
Potential Problems Related to the Current Structure of the Audit Market 
Oligopoly is an imperfectly competitive market. As such, audit firms can have long term 
abnormal profits, which are achieved by potentially charging higher fees than could be sustained 
in a competitive market.  This problem is exacerbated by the possibility of collusion.  Collusion 
can be explicit or tacit.  Explicit collusion, which is blatantly in violation of anti-trust laws, refers 
to major suppliers in the industry explicitly agreeing to reduce competition.  To be clear, there is 
no evidence that the Big 4 engage in explicit collusion.  However, tacit collusion refers to a 
situation where “several firms in an industry coordinate their production and pricing decisions by 
observance of each other’s competitive actions and responses” (Hoskisson et al., 2008, p. 195).  
Tacit collusion is more likely in the auditing industry, since it does not involve specific 
agreements among the major players.   
                                                                                                                                                             
in revenues in 2006, which is a significant decline from 2002, when the Big 4 audited 44%.  The 
percentage of the clients with revenues between $100 million and $500 million audited by the 
Big 4 has declined from 90% in 2002 to 71% in 2006 (US Treasury, 2008).   
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In a pure oligopoly, even in the absence of collusion, the small number of competitors 
can result in abnormal profits.  As discussed above, barriers to entry are very high, and the 
emergence of another large firm which would lead to a new Big 5 is highly unlikely.  This 
creates a serious concern for consumers of audit services, especially the largest ones, who 
realistically have a choice of only four firms. In the absence of healthy price competition, the 
price can be set high, and the client company, having fewer alternatives, would have to accept it.   
The oligopolistic structure of the audit market can also lead to problems related to the 
quality of work.  Since the market is highly concentrated, clients have few options if they chose 
to switch audit firms (which is especially true for the large clients).  Given that audits are 
differentiated professional services, firms are capable of competing not only on the basis of price 
but also on the basis of quality.  But if concentration is high and competition is low, the firms 
might not have incentives to engage in quality-based competition by offering higher quality 
services.  
Potential Advantages of the Current Market Structure.   
Audit firms that have strong positions in the market of a country could face cost 
advantages from economies of scale, which could be passed down to the customer in the form of 
a reduced fee.  For example, Walmart has cost advantages by controlling a large share of the 
market, and such cost advantages are passed on to the customer who can buy products at lower 
prices.  Similar strategies can be used in the market for audit services: once a firm gains a 
significant market share in a country, the firm can experience economies of scale, which then 
allows the firm to reduce audit fees but keep the same profit margins.  An example of a situation 
where economies of scale could prove advantageous is country-specific reporting requirements.  
Countries have unique reporting requirements which have to be reflected in the firm’s 
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technology – the databases have to be updated in order to ensure that all country-specific 
requirements are met.  Such investments in technology are country specific and are fixed costs 
which do not change based on the level of output. As such, gaining market share would allow the 
firms to distribute the technology costs over more units of output.  Economies of scale can also 
be obtained from administrative staff.  The number of administrative staff is not directly 
proportional to the number of professionals or the size of operations; as such, an increase in 
output would lead to economies of scale related to administrative staff costs.  Firms conduct 
national level training sessions on a yearly basis, and if such fixed costs are allocated across 
more clients, again economies of scale can be obtained.  Finally, one of the major issues a firm 
can face is under-utilization of its staff: the firms use almost all of their staff during the busy 
season, but slower times of the year can be associated with unassigned time, which essentially 
means a lot of unproductive costs for the firm.  With a bigger market share in a country, a firm 
could have more clients which can be audited in times other than the busy season, so the firm can 
distribute the work more evenly throughout the year; consequently even in the non-busy season, 
unassigned hours would be kept to a minimum. 
Audit Market Structure and Regulatory Environment 
A number of studies, as summarized in Wingate (1997), suggests that accounting 
environments are different across counties as evidenced by differences in, for example, 
professional status requirements related to licensure, accounting standards (IFRS versus local 
standards), and disclosure requirements.  One other key difference is litigation regime.  
Litigation regime refers to “risk of doing business as an auditor” (Wingate, 1997). In some 
countries auditors can face significant litigation payouts in case of an audit failure, e.g. the US.  
In other countries, like Germany, there is a cap on how much a firm can pay as a result of a law 
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suit (Weber et al., 2008).  Such differences can affect the amount and quality of audit procedures 
performed; firms are more likely to do more work, hence charge more and hypothetically do 
higher quality audits, in countries where a greater chance of a law suit and the potential payout is 
high (Choi, 2008).  Due to these differences the results obtained from analyzing the data from 
one country might not be generalizable globally.   
Audit Market Structure and Regulatory Bodies 
In 2010 the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee released a call for evidence to 
“explore concerns that market domination by a small number of firms damages competition and 
reduces choice in the audit market” (House of Lords, 2010.a).  One of the questions specifically 
asked was whether lack of competition is related to increases in fees.  The resulting report 
provided several important insights on the competition of the audit market.  The comments 
included in the report provided mixed evidence on the possible competitive nature of the audit 
market.  For example, the Chairman of PwC stated that the market was “fiercely competitive”, 
while the Chairman of the Financial Reporting Council and institutional investors disagreed 
noting current high levels of concentration and that changes were needed (House of Lords, 
2010.a). 
The results presented in the report showed that there was no lack of competition in the 
UK audit market. Furthermore, the results showed that the recent fee increases have not been 
related to the competition among audit firms, but instead to the nature of the work performed, i.e. 
SOX in the early 2000s and IFRS currently (House of Lords, 2010.b).  However, The Financial 
Reporting Council in the UK released the report by the Market Participants Group titled “Choice 
in the UK Audit Market”.  In the report, market participants expressed concerns over the current 
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concentration of the audit firms, and one of the main recommendations in the report was to 
improve the choice within the Big 4 (Market Participant Group, 2007).   
The House of Lords was also interested in the quality implications related to possible 
competition issues in the market, stating in its inquiry that “the narrow field of choice raises 
concerns about competition and the quality of audited accounts” (House of Lords, 2010.a, p.1).  
The resulting report included opinions and evidence from various sources, both from academia 
and practice.  While the Association of British Insurers specifically stated that “the concern is the 
cost of audit could be kept low at the expense of quality and conflict of interest” (House of 
Lords, 2010.b, p. 295), a majority of the evidence presented showed no negative effect of the 
current competition structure on audit quality.   
The European Union also voiced concerns over the current structure of the audit market, 
specifically noting that the Big 4 audit over 90% of publicly traded companies in the European 
Union.  The International Federation of Accountants responded to the concerns in the 2010 
Green Paper by stating that there is a need for empirical research to understand whether the 
current structure of the audit market presents a risk (European Commission, 2010).   
Finally, audit market structure has also been under scrutiny in the US.  The US 
Department of the Treasury released a report by the Advisory Committee on the Auditing 
Profession in 2008.  The evidence considered by the Committee included testimonies from the 
PCAOB, GAO, accounting firms and investors.  The Committee noted that audit market 
concentration has not been associated with higher fees or lower quality, however the Committee 
expressed the need to “reduce barriers to the growth of smaller auditing firms” (US Treasury, 
2008, p. VIII:4). The Committee also found no evidence that audit quality is negatively affected 
by the limited competition in the audit market.  The Committee agreed that there should be 
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regulatory changes to increase the market share of public client services by small accounting 
firms, thus making them more competitive with the Big 4.  The 2008 GAO report on the 
concentration in audit markets states that 82 percent of the Fortune 1000 companies were limited 
to at most three audit firms from which they could chose.  Furthermore, the survey conducted by 
GAO showed that 60% of the Fortune 1000 considered audit competition to be insufficient.  On 
the other hand the results of the study showed that small companies were more satisfied with 
audit firm concentration and available audit firm choices.   
The discussion above shows that competition in the audit market is an important topic 
discussed in the US and beyond, and concern has been raised about the current highly 
concentrated structure of the audit market.  However, the results presented by various 
governmental bodies found no evidence that high concentration was associated with increased 
fees or decreased quality.  These conclusions were based on testimonies and very few empirical 
findings were cited, therefore there is a need for an empirical examination of the relationship 
between audit firm competition and audit fees.  The purpose of this study is to 1) examine the 
relationship between the competition in the audit market and fees charged by the audit firms 
internationally; 2) investigate how this relationship is impacted by the country’s litigation regime 
and 3) examine how audit fees mediate the relationship between country level competition 
among audit firms and audit quality.     
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Effect of Competition on Audit Fees 
Prior Research  
Audit Market Structure 
Prior research has examined the structure of the audit market.  Eichenseher and Danos 
(1981) analyze auditor concentration on the industry level.  They use a four firm concentration 
ratio (the sum of the market shares of the four largest firms) as their proxy for competition and 
find that auditor concentration is positively associated with security issuances and regulatory 
control.  Danos and Eichenseher (1982) argue that audit firms with large shares of the overall 
audit market have cost advantages over other audit firms. Their results also show cost advantages 
related to having a large industry share. However their finding varied by the extent to which 
specific industries were regulated by the federal government.  Danos and Eichenseher (1986) 
investigate long term trends in the audit industry and conclude that the Big 8 firms had 
comparative advantage and thus a larger market share in serving large clients, but again this 
finding was true for mostly regulated industries.   
Following from Danos and Eichenseher (1982), Pearson and Trompeter (1994) 
investigated the relationship between the concentration and competition in the insurance industry 
audit market.  The authors measure concentration as the market share controlled by the top three 
of the six largest audit firms.   The results show a negative relationship between concentration 
and fees, suggesting that more concentrated markets have more price competition.    
Carson (2009) investigated the role of global audit networks using data from 60 
countries.  Her results suggest that there is a premium charged by the global industry leader.  
Carson et al. (2011) analyze Big N fee premiums using a sample of Australian companies.  Their 
48 
 
results show that the Big N fee premium increases with the decrease in the number of Big N 
audit firms.  In particular, the authors find that the size of the Big N premium paid by small 
clients increases as the number of Big N firms decreases.  Their results also show that the 
premium paid to a Big N industry leader increases with the decrease in the number of the Big N 
firms.  Bandiopandhyay and Kao (2004), using data from Ontario, show a positive relationship 
between market concentration in the audit market and audit fees for the Big 6, but their results 
did not hold for non-Big 6 firms.   
  Countries in which the firms operate vary in their legal and disclosure requirements.  As 
such, while there are firm-wide standards and regulations, audits have to be adjusted based on 
the country specific requirements.  Choi et al. (2008) use a sample from 15 countries to 
investigate the impact of the country’s litigation environment on audit fee premium.  The results 
show a positive relationship between audit fees and strictness of a country’s legal regime.  The 
results also show that the Big 4 fee premium is lower in countries where the legal regime is 
strict; this suggests that higher quality (and higher fees) is demanded by litigation risk.  Finally 
the authors find that the impact of the legal regime on the Big 4 fee premium is stronger for 
small and medium clients than for large clients.  Related to differences in legal regime, Choi and 
Wong (2007) use a sample from 39 countries to investigate the relationship between a country’s 
legal regime and the governance role of auditors.  The results show that auditors play a more 
significant governance function in the countries where the legal regime is weak than in those 
countries where the legal system is strong.   
 In summary, prior research on audit market structure suggest that firms with large market 
shares have cost advantages (Danos and Eichenseher, 1982, 1986).  However there is no 
consensus on whether or not such savings are passed down to the clients is the form of lower fees 
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(Pearson and Trompeter, 1994), or, as noted in Canada and Australia, whether high concentration 
leads to higher fees (Bandyopadhyay and Kao, 2004; Carson et al., 2011).    
Competition and Regulation 
Maher et al. (1992) investigate the changes in audit fees during a time of increased 
competitiveness.  The authors do not use a specific measure of competitiveness in the audit 
market; instead they compare audit fees in 1977 to 1981.  That four-year period was 
characterized by government criticism of anti-competitive behavior in the audit market and 
witnessed several regulatory changes intended to increase competition among audit firms.  The 
results show that, after controlling for inflation, the audit fees significantly decreased from 1977 
to 1981 supporting the notion that increased competition leads to lower audit fees. 
Sanders et al. (1995) use a larger sample of municipal audit fees for the years 1985-1989 
since that time period was marked by strong regulatory changes in the audit market which led to 
a more competitive environment.  Similar to Maher et al. (1992) the authors do not use specific 
measures of competition and focus simply on the change in audit fees from 1985 to 1989.  The 
results show an increase in audit fees that was less than the general rate of inflation.  The authors 
argue that real audit fees declined when the audit market became more competitive. 
Crittenden et al. (2003) investigate how the fee premiums were affected by a relaxation 
of anti-competitive restrictions in the UK.  The authors use a similar approach to Maher et al. 
(1992) and Sanders et al. (1995), i.e. the authors do not specifically measure competition levels 
but compare the fees before and after changes in competitive regulation.  The results show that 
top tier audit firms charged less premium once competition intensified.   
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In summary, prior research has investigated the effect of regulation on competition and 
fees and showed that if regulatory changes increased competition in the audit market, this also 
resulted in lower audit fees.   
Research Question Development 
 The market for audit services is oligopolistic: currently there are four large firms that 
dominate the market.  This is partly driven by the nature of the clients, auditing large 
multinational clients requires significant resources, which creates barriers to entry by preventing 
small audit firms that do not have sufficient resources to compete for large clients.  Further, 
oligopolistic competition is imperfect, and the providers are price setters as opposed to price 
takers, which can result in providers charging a fee premium in order to earn abnormal profits 
(Kaneko, 1978).  With respect to the auditing profession, these concerns have been expressed by 
the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management in The Accounting 
Establishment (1976): “the extremely high concentration of major corporate clients among the 
“Big Eight” firms … certainly presents a situation calling for investigation into the anti-
competitive effects which may reasonably be expected from such high concentration”.  As 
discussed in the earlier sections, another negative aspect of an oligopoly is a possibility of tacit 
collusion (Cox, 2006), which can lead to higher prices than would be observed under perfect 
competition.  Such implicit collusion is achieved more easily when there are only a few parties 
involved (Cox, 2006).  As such, if the market is very concentrated (dominated by a small number 
of service providers), collusion can be achieved more easily than in a less concentrated market.  
 On the other hand, if concentration leads to economies of scale, and the firms are willing 
to pass the saving down to their clients (Danos and Eichenseher, 1982; Pearson and Trompeter, 
1994), the fees would actually be lower in the more concentrated markets.  Furthermore, the 
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relationship between concentration and price can be different based on the size of the firm: the 
Big 4, due to their size, might be in a better position to benefit from economies of scale than 
smaller non-Big 4 firms.  Since there are two competing theoretical views on the phenomenon, I 
present the following research questions as opposed to hypotheses. 
RQ1a: Is concentration in the audit market associated with the fees charged by the 
Big N audit firms? 
RQ1b: Is concentration in the audit market associated with the fees charged by non-
Big N firms? 
As mentioned earlier, accounting environments are different across countries, and 
pressures that audit firms are facing are impacted by the litigiousness of the country: more 
litigious environment are expected to be associated with higher audit fees.  Litigation 
environment in a country can also impact the relationship between concentration and fees.  The 
firms in more litigious environments might want to ensure they have enough funds to cover any 
potential legal settlements.  From this standpoint, if the firms are using their oligopolistic power 
to charge higher fees (assuming there is a positive relationship between fees and concentration), 
they would charge even more in a more litigious environment, because expected legal costs are 
higher.  If the firms enjoy economies of scale from controlling a large share of the market 
(assuming there is a negative relationship between fees and concentration), they might be 
unwilling to pass that down to their clients in order to save funds in case of litigation payouts.   
On the other hand, the fees in less litigious countries are expected to be lower.  Audit 
firms, since they are very unlikely to get sued, could be more influenced by client bargaining 
power, which would put further downward pressure on the fees (in highly litigious environments 
the firms are less likely give in to client demands, because the risk of a law suit is great).  
Consequently the firms could have lower profit margins in less litigious countries.  So, if a firm 
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gains any economies of scale from gaining more market share, the firm might not be willing to 
pass any saving down to their clients, because the profit margins are low.   Since there are two 
theoretical views on how litigiousness of a country’s regime can affect the fees/concentration 
relationship, I state the second research question:     
RQ2: What is the effect of the litigation environment on the relationship between 
audit fees and market concentration? 
Competition and Audit Quality – Mediating Effect of Audit Fees 
Prior research 
Fees and quality 
Prior research shows mixed results related to the relationship between audit fees and 
audit quality.  Several studies, using various proxies for audit quality (accrual measures, Sirindhi 
and Gul (2007);  propensity to issue a going concern opinion, Geiger and Rama (2003) ;  
accruals and earnings, Frankel et al. (2002)), show a positive relation between fees and quality.  
On the other hand, Larcker and Richardson (2004) and Gul et al. (2003) use accrual measures to 
show that the relationship between audit fees and quality is negative
12
.  Finally, Craswell et al. 
(2002) show no relationship between audit fees and audit quality as measured by a propensity to 
issue a going concern
13
.   
                                                 
12
 A possible reason why the results in these studies are different from Frankel et al. (2002) is 
discussed in Reynolds et al. (2004) who show that the results in Frankel et al. (2002) were driven 
by small and medium high growth firms. 
13
 This study uses the same measure of audit quality as Geiger and Rama (2003), and differences 
in results can be due to the fact that Craswell et al. (2002) uses a sample of all available 




Prior research also shows that the relationship between fees and quality might not be 
symmetric; instead the relationship depends on the sign of accruals.  Choi et al. (2010) 
investigate a relationship between abnormal audit fees and audit quality, and find that companies 
with positive unexpected audit fees had lower audit quality, however the relationship did not 
hold for clients with negative unexpected fees.  Abbott et al. (2006) shows a positive relationship 
between audit fees and income increasing discretionary accruals, and a negative relationship 
between audit fees and income decreasing accruals.   
Quality and competition 
Prior research has examined the relationship between competition and audit quality and 
the results are mixed.  Francis et al. (2012) investigate the relationship between audit quality and 
concentration internationally and find a positive relationship between audit quality and the Big 4 
market dominance, but find a negative relationship between audit quality and market competition 
within the Big 4.  Kallapur et al (2010) also find a positive relationship between audit quality and 
competition at the metropolitan statistical area level in the US.  On the other hand Numan and 
Willekens (2011) show that audit quality, as measured by accruals and propensity to issue a 
going concern opinion, is negatively associated with competition at the office level.  
In summary, prior research has examined the relationship between fees and quality as 
well competition and quality providing mixed results.  However prior research has not 
investigated the inter-relationship among fees, concentration, and quality, specifically, whether 
fees could change the relationship between quality and concentration, which is the focus of the 
following section.  Understanding the inter-relationship among these three constructs could 
potentially provide additional insights which would explain why the results of prior research 




While prior research on audit fees, audit quality, and competition has investigated 
relationships between combinations of two of the three variables (fees, quality and 
concentration), this is the first study to consider all three of these aspects together.  I argue that 
the relationship between competition and audit quality is mediated by audit fees.  Mediation is 
tested using the method introduced by Baron and Kenny (1986), according to which mediation 
occurs when the following conditions are met: 
A) There is a significant relationship between the independent and the dependent 
variables. 
B) There is a significant relationship between the independent and the mediating 
variables. 
C) After controlling for the mediating variable the relationship between the dependent 
and the mediating variable is significant, but the relationship between the independent 
and the dependent variables is not significant (full mediation) or less significant 
(partial mediation) than in (A). 
The first condition in the mediation test will be addressed by testing the relationship 
between concentration (independent variable) and audit quality (dependent variable).  Since the 
results of prior research were mixed, I do not provide a directional hypothesis on this 
relationship.   
The second condition in the mediation test will be addressed by testing the relationship 
between concentration (independent variable) and audit fees (mediating variable).  As discussed 
previously, there are competing theoretical views on this relationship. As such, I do not provide a 
directional hypothesis on the relationship between concentration and audit fees.   
The third condition is the mediation test.  It will be addressed by testing the relationship 
between audit quality and concentration while controlling for fees.  Prior research on the 
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relationship between audit fees and audit quality showed mixed results.  However my arguments 
rely on the reasoning that audit fees are proxies for audit effort, and a high level of effort leads to 
high quality (Caramanis and Lennox, 2009); as such, the relationship between audit fees and 
audit quality (before concentration is controlled for) is expected to be positive.  As noted above, 
higher competition puts a downward pressure on audit fees.  However, in spite of this, firms are 
expected to be still interested in maintaining their profit margins.  Thus, when faced with 
competitive pressures to reduce fees, firms would be pressed to reduce their costs.  Cost 
reduction can be achieved by reducing the effort, which is expected to lead to lower audit 
quality.  In summary, I will test the proposition that competition does not affect audit quality 
directly, but does so through audit fees.  Increased competition puts downward pressure on audit 
fees, which causes the firms to reduce their effort, which in its turn, leads to lower audit quality.  
Therefore, I expect audit fees to mediate the relationship between audit quality and 
concentration.  This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Audit fees mediate the relationship between audit quality and concentration at 
a country level.      
 
Research Methods 
 Concentration Measures 
I use concentration as a measure of competition, and all concentration measures are 
calculated at the country level.  A two-firm concentration ratio calculated as the market portion 
controlled by the two largest audit firms for each country year divided by the total audit market 
in each country each year. This measure is used to test all research questions as well as H1.  
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Ideally, the concentration ratio is calculated using audit fees. However the data on audit fees is 
limited, thus I use square roots of clients’ assets in order to calculate the concentration ratios.  
Using square roots of clients’ assets instead of total client’s assets provides a better 
approximation for the market share because square roots of assets are better estimates of audit 
fees than total assets, consistent with prior research (Cahan et al.,2008; Danos and Eichenseher, 
1982; and Simunic,1980). 
The following formula is used to calculate the concentration ratio:  
CR2 = (∑ √Ai)/ (∑ √Atotal),    (4) 
where CR2 is the two-firm concentration ratio; Ai refers to the client assets audited by the two 
largest audit firms in a country, Atotal refers to the total assets in the country.   
             RQ1a, examining the relationship between fees and concentration for the Big 4 firms, is 
tested using two concentration measures
14
.  The first measure is the two-firm concentration ratio 
calculated as described above.  The second is the Herfindahl index, which is a common measure 
of competition (Bandiopandhyay and Kao, 2004; Francis et al., 2011; Kallapur, 2008).  
Furthermore, while the CR2 measures the market share controlled by the two largest firms, the 
Herfindahl index measures the competition within the Big 4 group (Francis et al., 2011).  The 
Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of the squares of the market shares of each audit firm: 
                                                 
14
 A number of observations in the data have “other” as the auditor.  As such HI could not 
be calculated, since I cannot make an assumption that “other” refers to the same audit firm.  
Therefore the market shares of each individual firm (and subsequently HI) which was coded 
“other” cannot be accurately calculated.  Since RQ1a requires the sample of only the Big N, all 
observations coded “other” are excluded from such sample, consequently HI can be accurately 




            N 
HI = ∑i (si / S)
2
,           (5) 
where HI is the Herfindahl index, N refers to the number of audit firms in the country; si is the 
size of the audit firm’s client base, S is the size of the complete audit market in the country.  
Consistent with the CR2 measure, size of the audit firm is measured by the sum of the square 
roots of the firm’s clients’ assets, and the country markets are measured by the sum of the square 
roots of total assets in each country.   
Testing RQ1  
The following model is used to examine the research questions: 
FEE = β0 + β1CONCEN + β2LITIG + β3CONCEN*LITIG + β4SIZE + β5CATA + 
β6LOSS + β7OPAT_TA + β8LEV + β9GDP + β10SOX + fixed effects + ε          (6) 
Where 
FEE = the natural log of total audit fees paid by the company;   
CONCEN = the concentration ratio measured using CR2 and HI for tests of RQ1a, and 
CR2 for testing RQ1b and H1;   
LITIG = litigation index from Wingate (1997); 
SIZE = the natural log of total assets; 
CATA = the ratio of current assets to total assets; 
LOSS = the indicator variable coded 1 if the company had a loss and 0 otherwise; 
OPAT_TA = the ratio of net profit to total assets; 
LEV = the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; 
GDP = gross domestic product per capita, in thousands, as provided by the World Bank; 
SOX = indicator variable coded 1 if fiscal year end is after 2001; 




CONCEN, and CONCEN*LITIG are the main independent variables of interest.  Since I 
provide competing theoretical views on the relationship between concentration and fees and how 
this relationship is affected by the litigation environment, I do not predict a sign on β1 and β3.  
Litigation environment is expected to be associated with higher fees (Choi et al., 2008), as such 
the expected coefficient on LITIG is positive.   
Prior research has shown size to be the main determinant of audit fees with large clients 
paying more (Simunic, 1980); as such the expected sign on SIZE is positive.  CATA is also 
expected to also be positively related to audit fees, consequently the expected coefficient on 
CATA is positive (Carson, 2009).  A company that posts a loss is likely to face additional 
pressures and risks related to poor financial performance, which would require additional audit 
procedures to be performed; thus the expected coefficient on LOSS is positive (Carson, 2009).  
Profitable companies are presumably, on average, less risky, and have been shown to pay lower 
fees, thus the expected coefficient on OPAT_TA is negative (Carson, 2009).  Increased leverage 
increases the audit risk of a company, which has been shown to result in companies paying 
higher fees; consequently the expected coefficient on LEV is positive (Choi et al., 2010).   
Wingate (1997) lists a number of country-wide indices based on the countries’ audit 
environments.  Level of litigiousness is the index that is the most relevant to the audit fees.  
Liability standard refers to the “risk of doing business as an auditor”.  Higher risk of liability and 
public enforcement on the part of the audit firm will put upward pressure on the number and 
complexity of procedures the firm would be performing, which would lead to higher audit fees.  
Given this, the expected coefficient on LITIG (Wingate, 1997) is positive.  Using this variable is 
consistent with Choi et al. (2008).   
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GDP per capita in thousands is a measure of the cost of living in a country; as such I 
expect a positive association between GDP and FEE (Choi et al., 2008).  Sarbanes Oxley 
increased scrutiny over audit quality around the world and created new audit requirements (e.g. 
section 404), which is expected to be associated with high audit fees; consequently I expect a 
positive coefficient on SOX. 
Hypothesis 1 
Audit quality is proxied by absolute discretionary accruals which are estimated using the 
modified Jones (1991) model.  Discretionary accruals are calculated by saving residuals from 
Equation 7.  The equation is estimated by year/country/industry. 
ACCRt/TAt-1 = β11/ TAt-1 + β2(REVRECt)/TAt-1 + β3PPEt/ TAt-1  + ε           (7) 
 ACCR refers to total accruals, which include non-discretionary as well as discretionary 
accruals.  Total accruals are calculated by subtracting operating cash flows from net income 
before extraordinary items and discontinued operations.  TAt-1 is total assets in the prior period.  
REVREC is calculated as the difference between change in sales and change in receivables from 
the prior year.  Finally, PPE refers to gross property, plant, and equipment.   
The following models are used to test mediation: 
Condition 1 (the relationship between audit quality and concentration) is tested using 
Equation 8: 
DA = β0 + β1CONCEN + β2LITIG + β3BIGN + β4SIZE + β5OPAT_TA + β6GROWTH + 
β7LEV + β8LOSS + β9GDP + β10SOX+ fixed effects + ε            (8) 
 
Condition 2 (the relationship between audit fees and concentration) is tested using 
Equation 9: 
FEE = β0 + β1CONCEN + β2LITIG + β3BIGN + β4SIZE + β5OPAT_TA + β6GROWTH + 




Condition 3 (the mediation test which examines the relationship between quality and 
concentration controlling for fees) is tested using Equation 10. 
DA = β0 + β1FEE + β2CONCEN + β2LITIG + β3BIGN + β4SIZE + β5OPAT_TA + 
β6GROWTH + β7LEV + β8LOSS + β9GDP + β10SOX+ fixed effects + ε        (10) 
 
CONCEN, FEE, LITIG, SIZE, OPAT_TA, LEV, LOSS, GDP, and SOX were defined in 
the previous section.   
DA = absolute discretionary accruals calculated using the modified Jones (1991) model 
included in equation 7; 
BIGN = indicator variables coded 1 if the audit firm is a Big N firm; 
GROWTH = sales growth from prior year calculated as change in sales from prior year 
divided by total assets (this allows capturing all companies who might have zero sales in 
the previous year). 
I do not predict the sign of the coefficient on CONCEN in Equation 8, Equation 9, or 
Equation 10 due to competing theoretical views on the relationship between competition (as 
proxied by concentration) and audit quality.  I expect a positive relationship between audit fees 
and audit quality (a proxy for audit effort).  Therefore the expected coefficient on FEE in 
Equation 10 is positive.  Finally I expect the coefficient on CONCEN in Equation 10 to be not 
significant, because I expect audit fees to fully mediate the relationship between competition and 
audit quality.    
Consistent with prior research, large companies are expected to have lower discretionary 
accruals (Francis et al., 2012; Frankel et al., 2002); as such the expected coefficient of SIZE is 
negative.  Prior research has also shown that the clients of the Big 4 have lower discretionary 
accruals (Becker et al., 1998).  Thus, I expect a negative coefficient for the BIG4.  LOSS and 
LEV, are measures of a company’s risk: companies with low profitability and high leverage are 
likely to display higher discretionary accruals; including these variables is consistent with prior 
research (Lim and Tan, 2008; Frankel et al., 2002; Francis et al., 2012); fast growing companies 
are also expected to have higher discretionary accruals due to changes in operations as a result of 
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expansion (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008); therefore I expect positive coefficients on LEV and 
LOSS, and GROWTH.   
I expect audit quality to be higher in countries with higher legal liability standards, 
because in such countries auditors have high chances of litigation and high potential payouts.  
Given this I expect a negative coefficient on the LITIG variable, which is consistent with Francis 
et al. (2012).  Countries with higher GDP per capita are expected to have a developed financial 




The sample was obtained from the Extel/Company Analysis database and Global 
Compustat for the years 1998-2009.  The Extel database includes audit fees and financial data for 
all observations used in testing.  Data from Compustat was used to increase the number of 
observations used to calculate concentration ratios to make those measures more representative 
of the population.  I exclude all observations from India, Pakistan, South Korea, and Japan 
because international audit firms operate in those countries through local affiliates which are not 
coded in the database.  I also exclude all observations from France, because French companies 
are required to have two auditors, and most observations in the database only had one auditor 
coded.  All firm years which were unaudited are also excluded.  All observations that were 
missing data necessary to calculate financial variables are also excluded.  The sample used for 
testing RQ1a also excludes all non-Big N clients, similarly the sample used for testing RQ1b 
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excludes all the Big 4. RQ2 is tested separately for the Big4 and non-Big 4 firms.  I also exclude 
all countries with less than 100 observations and all country-years where the concentration ratio 
was calculated based on less than 50 observations.   All continuous variables in the model are 




 percentiles.   
RQ1 is focused on the relationship between fees and market concentration for the Big N 
firms and is tested using the sample which consisted of 16,078 firm years from 14 countries.  
Summary by country is included in Table 6.  All items in the table are averages for the sample 
period.    The mean Wingate litigation index is 7.57, USA, UK, Canada, Hong Kong, Australia 
and New Zealand are above the mean, indicating they are more litigious countries, with the US 
being the most litigious with a litigation index of 15.  The most concentrated audit market is in 
Ireland (CR2=0.83, HHI=0.45), and the least concentrated market is in Malaysia (CR2=0.47, 
HHI=0.16).  Audit fees are the highest in the US (average $19 million) and the lowest in 
Malaysia ($77 thousand).   
Descriptive statistics are included in Table 7 and the correlation matrix is included in 
Table 8.  Audit fees as positively associated with both market concentration measures, the 
litigation environment of a country, interactions between market concentration and litigation 
environment, having a Big N auditor, size of the client, ratio of current assets to total assets, 
leverage, and GDP per capita in the country. Fees are also higher after Sarbanes Oxley. 
Surprisingly, there is a negative correlation between having a loss and fees; there is also a 
positive correlation between profitability and fees.   
Correlations between HI and CR2, FEE and SIZE, CR2*LITIG and HI*LITIG, LITIG 
and CR2* LITIG, LITIG and HI*LITIG are above 0.7.  SIZE is highly negatively correlated with 
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LOSS (-0.42) and positively correlated with OPAT_TA (0.4).  GDP is highly correlated with 
LITIG, CR2*LITIG, HI*LITIG, and SOX (0.57, 0.44, 0.47 and 0.51 respectively).  Other 
correlations above 0.25 are LITIG and CR2 (-0.32), OPAT_TA and LOSS (-0.53).  Correlation 
between CR2*LITIG and LITIG is very high (0.76) and correlation between HI*LITIG and 
LITIG is very high as well (0.77), suggesting multicollinearity problems in the model.  In order 
to address these collinearity issues I first re-estimate Model 3 without the interaction variables to 
determine the relationship between audit fees and market concentration.  Then, in order to 
investigate how the fee-concentration relationship is affected by the litigation regime, I divide 
the sample into high and low litigation countries and I re-estimate Model 3 separately for each 
sub-sample
15
.  Finally, I compare the coefficients on the concentration measures
16
.   
Table 9 includes multivariate results of the model to test RQ1.  If CR2 is used as a 
measure of concentration, the results show that the fees are lower in highly concentrated markets 
(t=-2.02), suggesting economies of scale.  However if HI is used as a measure of concentration, 
then the result no longer holds (t=-0.99).  All other variables are significant in predicted 
directions.  The model is estimated with robust standard errors and clustering by firm.   
In order to investigate how the relationship between fees and concentration is affected by 
the litigation environment of the country, I separate the observations into low and high litigation 
environments (countries with litigation index above the mean litigation index of 7.57 are 
                                                 
15
 Since the sub-samples are created based on a country’s litigation environment, LITIG is going 
to be the same for all observations in each sub-sample.  Therefore Model 3 used to test for these 
subsample does not include the CONCEN*LITIG. 
16
 I estimated the full model, including the interactions variables, using mean centered and 
standardized values of CONCEN, LITIG and the interaction between these variables in order to 
reduce collinearity problems.  The VIF’s still indicated high multicollinearity, therefore I re-
estimated the model separately for high and low litigation countries and compared coefficients to 
test the impact of the litigation environments on the concentration-fee relationship in order to 
avoid collinearity issues.    
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considered highly litigious), re-estimate Model 6 and then compare coefficients on market 
concentration across the two regressions.  Table 10 summarizes the results for both measures of 
market concentration: results using a two-firm concentration ratio are included in Panel A and 
results using Herfindahl index are included in Panel B.  The results suggest that the relationship 
between audit fees and concentration is affected by the regulatory regime.  In highly litigious 
countries high market concentration is associated with low audit fees (t=-4.9 using CR2 and t=-
4.71 using HI), which suggests that the firms obtain economies of scale in concentrated markets, 
and those economies of scale are passed down to their clients.  What is surprising is the fact that 
in less litigious countries, concentrated audit markets are actually associated with higher audit 
fees: the association is significant using the CR2 measure (t=2.08) and is marginally significant 
using the HI measure (t=1.84).   
 The coefficients of both CR2 and HI are negative and are significantly lower in countries 
with high litigation than in countries with low litigation (Chi-squared of 21.58 using CR2 and 
22.72 using HI, which are both significant at p<0.001), which suggests that audit firms are more 
likely to pass savings obtained from economies of scale to their clients in highly litigious 
countries than in less litigious countries.  One possible explanation of such phenomenon is as 
follows: audit fees are lower in less litigious countries, furthermore since the likelihood of a law 
suit is relatively remote (e.g. in Norway there were 40 litigation cases against audit firms from 
1945 to 2005, as discussed in Hope and Langli, 2010), the firms could be more influenced by 
client’s bargaining power, which would could potentially lead the firms to have lower profit 
margins than what they would be able to obtain in a more litigious environment.  If the profit 
margins are low, even if the firms do obtain economies of scale from gaining market share, they 
would not be willing to pass those down to their clients.  Since I do not have the data on 
65 
 
profitability of the firms, I cannot test this notion; as such future research can focus on providing 
an explanation of this phenomenon.   
For additional testing I re-estimate the model only for the post-Sox subsample, the results 
(untabulated) were qualitatively the same.  A large number of observations in the sample are 
from Australia (6,222) and the United Kingdom (4,905). In order to make sure that the results are 
not driven by one country, the model is re-estimated excluding each of these countries, one at a 
time. The results (untabulated) are qualitatively the same. 
In order to answer RQ1b (the relationship between fees and concentration for non-Big 4 
firms), I first estimate Model 6 without the interaction variables (in order to avoid 
multicollinearity problems) for all non-Big 4 observations; the results are included in Table 11.  
The results presented in Panel A do not show a significant association between concentration and 
fees, but surprisingly, the relationship between fees and litigiousness of the country’s 
environment was negative.  However this result seems to be driven by Australian observations: 
once observations from Australia are excluded, the coefficient on LITIG becomes significantly 
positive and the coefficient on CR2 becomes significantly negative (Panel B).   
In order to investigate how the relationship between concentration and fees for non-Big 4 
firms is impacted by the litigiousness of a country, I re-estimate Model 6 separately for highly 
litigious and less litigious countries and compare coefficients on CR2 (Model 6 is estimated 
without LITIG and CONCEN*LITIG, because LITIG is the same for all observation in a sub-
sample).  The results are included in Table 12.  The analysis showed no significant differences 
between the relationship between audit fees and market concentration in highly litigious and less 
litigious countries.  The results are similar when all Australian observations are excluded.   
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In summary, the results obtained using the Big N sample do not hold when non-Big N 
observations are used.  This could be partly due to the fact that economies of scale observed in 
highly litigious environments in Big N firms are not obtainable by smaller firms simply due to 
their size, or non-Big N firms have fewer resources and are less likely to be sued.  On the other 
hand the results for non-Big N firms could be affected by the sample size limitation: the analysis 
is based on observations from only six countries (as opposed to the Big N analysis based on 14 
countries).   
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis one predicts a mediating effect of audit fees on the relationship between audit 
quality and audit market concentration.  In order for mediation to occur there should be a 
significant relationship between audit quality and concentration, there also should be a 
significant relationship between audit fees and concentration; finally once audit fees are included 
in the model the relationship between audit quality and concentration should disappear (full 
mediation) or weaken (partial mediation).  Partial mediation is determined using the Sobel test, 
which is consistent with Reffett (2010), Denison (2009).  Mediation is tested using a sample of 
7,598 observations from six countries.  This sample is much smaller than the sample which was 
used to test the relationship between audit fees and market concentration in the previous section. 
This is primarily due to the fact that discretionary accrual models do not include observations 
from financial firms and utilities.  Also, in order to estimate discretionary accruals, each industry 
year requires a minimum of ten observations.   The results are summarized in Table 13.  All 




 percentiles.  There is a 
significantly negative relationship between discretionary accruals and concentration (t=-10.37, 
see Panel A), suggesting that audit quality is higher is more concentrated markets (which is 
67 
 
consistent with Francis et al., 2011).  There is a significantly negative relationship between audit 
fees and concentration (t=-2.30, see Panel B), which suggests that in concentrated markets the 
firms take advantage of economies of scale and pass savings down to their clients.  However 
once discretionary accruals are regressed on audit fees and market concentration, the coefficients 
on both independent variables remain significantly negative (see Panel C).  Sobel mediation test 
(which relies on the Baron and Kenney (1986) procedure described above) is marginally 
significant (p=0.074) however adding the fees to the quality/concentration model does not reduce 
the effect of concentration on quality but instead increases it by a very small margin (0.7%).  As 
such the expected mediation effect of fees was not observed.   
Conclusion 
This study was focused on three main areas: the relationship between country level audit 
market concentration, how this relationship is affected by the country’s litigation regime, and 
whether audit fees mediate the relationship between market concentration and audit quality.   
The audit market is oligopolistic. As such as the market becomes more concentrated, 
firms can use their oligopoly powers to charge higher fees. This would suggest that high market 
concentration has a negative effect on clients.  On the other hand, when the market is more 
concentrated, the firms can take advantages of economies of scale and pass some of the savings 
to their clients by charging lower fees in more concentrated markets.  The current market 
structure has been the subject of investigations by the US Treasury Department, the UK House of 
Lords, and the International Federation of Accountants, suggesting that the topic is very relevant 
to the regulatory bodies.  While prior research has examined the relationship between 
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geographical market concentration and audit fees, the results were based on observations from 
one country.  Audit environments differ from country to country, as such results based on 
observations from one country only might not be generalizable to other countries. 
In this paper I show that the relationship between market concentration and audit fees is 
different depending on the litigation environment of the country.  Auditors in highly litigious 
countries seem to obtain economies of scale and are willing to pass the savings down to their 
clients by reducing their fees, which is suggested by a negative relationship between market 
concentration and audit fees in such countries.  However this behavior is not observed in less 
litigious countries.  This could be due to the fact that since the fees in less litigious countries are 
lower, the profit margins that the firms have are also lower than what they would be in more 
litigious countries.  Consequently, the firms are not willing to pass down any saving obtained 
from economies of scale to their clients.  Since I do not have the data on audit firm profitability 
around the world to investigate whether this proposition is correct, it can be tested in future 
research.  From a regulatory perspective, the results in this emphasize the importance of a strong 
litigation regime in a country.  If a country is highly litigious, the clients actually benefit from 
high concentration in the audit market.  Finally, I do not find that the relationship between audit 
fees and audit quality is mediated by audit fees, but I do observe a positive relationship between 





Table 6 – Descriptive Statistics by Country – Big N Firms 
 
n CR2 HI Litigation Average Fee 
Australia 6,222 0.53342 0.198926 10 $10,800,000 
Canada 301 0.636252 0.269919 8.07 $15,000,000 
Germany 117 0.579879 0.232057 6.22 $2,339,529 
Hong Kong 417 0.677201 0.273688 10 $255,113 
Ireland 157 0.839996 0.445672 6.22 $3,634,164 
Malaysia 843 0.474665 0.155218 3.61 $77,316 
New Zealand 342 0.701504 0.302435 10 $166,773 
Norway 105 0.678862 0.308103 6.22 $6,945,420 
Singapore 566 0.653619 0.261276 4.82 $177,088 
South Africa 567 0.674844 0.279986 4.82 $998,108 
Sweden 154 0.620075 0.272783 4.82 $452,237 
Switzerland 163 0.781803 0.373068 6.22 $1,669,996 
United States 1,219 0.490818 0.210276 15 $19,000,000 
United Kingdom 4,905 0.546638 0.207875 10 $1,076,757 
Total 16,078     
CR2 is two firm concentration ratio 
HHI is Herfindahl Index 











Table 7 - Descriptive Statistics – Big N Firms 
 
N Mean SD 25% Median 75% 
FEE 16078 11.6851 1.69247 10.4226 11.5071 12.7301 
CR2 16078 0.55722 0.0811 0.50916 0.55949 0.57381 
HI 16078 0.21658 0.05275 0.19201 0.2137 0.22906 
LITIG 16078 9.46585 2.53982 10 10 10 
CR2* LITIG 16078 0.4548 0.20972 0.46878 0.53227 0.56776 
HI* LITIG 16078 0.17493 0.08341 0.17868 0.20103 0.21899 
SIZE 16078 18.6891 2.23638 17.1463 18.6752 20.1432 
CATA 16078 0.41411 0.28579 0.15502 0.39156 0.63191 
LOSS 16078 0.35185 0.47756 0 0 1 
OPAT_TA 16078 -0.0702 0.36135 -0.0475 0.0217 0.06655 
LEV 16078 0.47106 0.34695 0.21933 0.4488 0.64942 
GDP 16078 29.3701 11.6432 21.768 27.1729 38.1957 
SOX 16078 0.67291 0.46917 0 1 1 
FEE is the natural log of total audit fees paid by the company;  
CR2 is two firm concentration ratio;  
HI is Herfindahl Index;  
LITIG is Liability Index from Wingate (1997) 
SIZE is the natural log of total assets;  
CATA is the ratio of current assets to total assets;  
LOSS is the indicator variable coded 1 if the company had a loss and 0 otherwise;  
OPAT_TA is the ratio of net profit to total assets;  
LEV is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets;  
GDP is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in each country; 










Table 8 - Correlation Matrix – Big N Firms 
  FEE CR2 HI LITIG CR2*LITIG HI*LITIG SIZE 
        FEE 1 
      CR2 0.0786 1 
     HI 0.1649 0.9081 1 
    LITIG 0.2426 -0.3167 -0.1748 1 
   CR2*LITIG 0.0305 -0.1527 -0.1574 0.7623 1 
  HI*LITIG 0.0757 -0.105 -0.075 0.7713 0.9836 1 
 SIZE 0.7367 0.084 0.1387 0.0926 -0.0489 -0.0088 1 
CATA 0.0286 0.0044 0.002 -0.0267 -0.0627 -0.0602 -0.2809 
LOSS -0.2307 -0.095 -0.1007 0.039 0.0621 0.0451 -0.4163 
OPAT_TA 0.1966 0.0815 0.0853 -0.0401 -0.0581 -0.0432 0.3972 
LEV 0.318 -0.0163 0.0005 -0.0672 -0.1283 -0.1137 0.217 
GDP 0.3199 0.0171 0.1583 0.5716 0.4431 0.4749 0.1742 




CATA LOSS OPAT_TA LEV GDP SOX 
 CATA 1 
      LOSS 0.0839 1 
     OPAT_TA -0.121 -0.5299 1 
    LEV 0.1109 0.0112 -0.1922 1 
   GDP -0.0265 -0.0064 0.0161 -0.0533 1 
  SOX -0.0012 -0.0099 0.0087 -0.0177 0.5081 1 
  
FEE is the natural log of total audit fees paid by the company;  
CR2 is two firm concentration ratio;  
HI is Herfindahl Index;  
LITIG is Liability Index from Wingate (1997) 
SIZE is the natural log of total assets;  
CATA is the ratio of current assets to total assets;  
LOSS is the indicator variable coded 1 if the company had a loss and 0 otherwise;  
OPAT_TA is the ratio of net profit to total assets;  
LEV is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets;  
GDP is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in each country; 




Table 9 - Multivariate Results – Big N Firms 
FEE 
Pred
. CR2 t-value HI t-value 
 CR2 +/- -0.3371 -2.02** 
   HI +/- 
  
-0.2655 -0.99 
 LITIG + 0.1868 14.63*** 0.1824 15.02*** 
 SIZE + 0.5541 70*** 0.5539 70*** 
 CATA + 0.6510 13.44*** 0.6499 13.42*** 
 LOSS + 0.1246 5.66*** 0.1242 5.65*** 
 OPAT_TA - -0.1369 -5.14*** -0.1370 -5.14*** 
 LEV + 0.5183 15.09*** 0.5184 15.1*** 
 GDP + 0.0063 2.25** 0.0073 2.73*** 
 SOX + 0.5016 8.44*** 0.4831 8.49*** 
 


























  FEE is the natural log of total audit fees paid by the company;  
CR2 is two firm concentration ratio;  
HI is Herfindahl Index;  
LITIG is Liability Index from Wingate (1997) 
SIZE is the natural log of total assets;  
CATA is the ratio of current assets to total assets;  
LOSS is the indicator variable coded 1 if the company had a loss and 0 otherwise;  
OPAT_TA is the ratio of net profit to total assets;  
LEV is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets;  
GDP is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in each country; 
SOX is an indicator variable coded 1 if fiscal years are after 2001 and 0 otherwise. 









Table 10 - Effect of the Litigation Regime – Big N firms 





 FEE Coefficient t-value 
 
Coefficient t-value Chi-Squared 
CR2 -1.0832 -4.9*** 
 
0.5958 2.08** 21.58*** 
SIZE 0.5479 61.82*** 
 
0.5836 34.16*** 
 CATA 0.6420 11.79*** 
 
0.6034 5.82*** 
 LOSS 0.1146 4.65*** 
 
0.2119 4.7*** 
 OPAT_TA -0.1341 -4.68*** 
 
-0.1271 -1.69* 
 LEV 0.5849 14.83*** 
 
0.3063 4.31*** 
 GDP -0.0005 -0.14 
 
0.0091 1.43 









 FEE Coefficient t-value 
 
Coefficient t-value Chi-Squared 
HI -2.0245 -4.71*** 
 
0.6893 1.84* 22.72*** 
SIZE 0.5478 61.82*** 
 
0.5834 34.21*** 
 CATA 0.6419 11.8*** 
 
0.6057 5.83*** 
 LOSS 0.1144 4.64*** 
 
0.2128 4.72*** 
 OPAT_TA -0.1332 -4.64*** 
 
-0.1248 -1.67* 
 LEV 0.5857 14.85*** 
 
0.3073 4.33*** 
 GDP 0.0037 1.11 
 
0.0070 1.1 
 SOX 0.1747 4.16*** 
 
0.2843 2.83*** 
 FEE is the natural log of total audit fees paid by the company;  
CR2 is two firm concentration ratio;  
HI is Herfindahl Index;  
SIZE is the natural log of total assets;  
CATA is the ratio of current assets to total assets;  
LOSS is the indicator variable coded 1 if the company had a loss and 0 otherwise;  
OPAT_TA is the ratio of net profit to total assets;  
LEV is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets;  
GDP is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in each country; 
SOX is an indicator variable coded 1 if fiscal years are after 2001 and 0 otherwise. 











All non-Big 4 
 
Excluding Australia 
FEE Pred. Coef. t-value 
 
Coef. t-value 
CR2 +/- -0.0759 -0.27 
 
-0.7248 -2.04** 
LITIG + -0.1939 -6.07*** 
 
0.06731 2.59*** 
SIZE + 0.43994 39.33*** 
 
0.49302 36.06*** 
CATA + 0.31702 5.97*** 
 
0.3438 5.11*** 
LOSS + 0.0364 1.33 
 
0.15613 4.69*** 
OPAT_TA - -0.0863 -6.67*** 
 
-0.0687 -3.75*** 
LEV + 0.12556 6.41*** 
 
0.10997 4.39*** 
GDP + 0.01481 3.81*** 
 
-0.0093 -1.32 
SOX + 0.2275 2.12** 
 
0.36617 2.99*** 
       

























FEE is the natural log of total audit fees paid by the company;  
CR2 is two firm concentration ratio;  
SIZE is the natural log of total assets;  
CATA is the ratio of current assets to total assets;  
LOSS is the indicator variable coded 1 if the company had a loss and 0 otherwise;  
OPAT_TA is the ratio of net profit to total assets;  
LEV is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets;  
GDP is the GDP per capita in each country in thousands; 
SOX is an indicator variable coded 1 if fiscal years are after 2001 and 0 otherwise. 














 FEE Coefficient t-value 
 
Coefficient t-value Chi-Squared 
CR2 0.6779 1.91* 
 
0.4785 0.9 0.1 
SIZE 0.4219 36.23*** 
 
0.5805 18.23*** 
 CATA 0.2930 5.37*** 
 
0.2762 1.63 
 LOSS 0.0191 0.66 
 
0.2108 2.74*** 
 OPAT_TA -0.0779 -5.99*** 
 
-0.0535 -0.9 
 LEV 0.1355 6.87*** 
 
0.0647 1.17 
 GDP 0.0224 4.76*** 
 
-0.0578 -2.77*** 
 SOX 0.0104 0.08 
 
0.5861 2.83*** 
 FEE is the natural log of total audit fees paid by the company;  
CR2 is two firm concentration ratio;  
SIZE is the natural log of total assets;  
CATA is the ratio of current assets to total assets;  
LOSS is the indicator variable coded 1 if the company had a loss and 0 otherwise;  
OPAT_TA is the ratio of net profit to total assets;  
LEV is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets;  
GDP is the GDP per capita in each country in thousands; 
SOX is an indicator variable coded 1 if fiscal years are after 2001 and 0 otherwise. 











Table 13 - Mediation Analysis 
Panel A    Panel B    
DAC Coef. t-value 
 
FEE Coef. t-value 
 CR2 -52640 -10.37*** 
 
CR2 -0.7525 -2.3** 
 WIN -89.479 -0.36 
 
WIN 0.20214 12.71*** 
 BIGN 767.029 2.51** 
 
BIGN 0.29303 14.86*** 
 SIZE -60.274 -0.67 
 
SIZE 0.54121 93.82*** 
 OPAT_TA 13.5172 0.04 
 
OPAT_TA -0.2961 -12.76*** 
 GROWTH 85.8958 0.26 
 
GROWTH -0.0167 -0.79 
 LEV -287.65 -0.6 
 
LEV 0.54032 17.4*** 
 LOSS -395.97 -1.13 
 
LOSS 0.00514 0.23 
 SOX -3494 -0.3 
 
SOX -0.0814 -0.11 
 GDP 131.381 2.22** 
 
GDP -0.0009 -0.24 
 
        Panel C 
       DAC Coef t-value 
  
Z P>|Z| 
FEE -505.83 -2.84*** 
 
Sobel Test 1.786 0.074 
CR2 -53020 -10.45*** 
 
Proportion of total  
WIN 12.7695 0.05 
 
effect that is mediated 
 
-0.0072 
BIGN 915.252 2.95*** 
     SIZE 213.485 1.62 
     OPAT_TA -136.24 -0.37 
     GROWTH 77.4505 0.23 
     LEV -14.343 -0.03 
     LOSS -393.37 -1.13 
     SOX -3535.2 -0.3 
     GDP 130.909 2.21** 
     DAC is absolute discretionary accruals; 
FEE is the natural log of total audit fees paid by the company;  
CR2 is two firm concentration ratio;  
LITIG is Liability Index from Wingate (1997) 
SIZE is the natural log of total assets;  
CATA is the ratio of current assets to total assets;  
LOSS is the indicator variable coded 1 if the company had a loss and 0 otherwise;  
OPAT_TA is the ratio of net profit to total assets;  
GROWTH is increase in revenues since prior year scaled by total assets; 
LEV is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets;  
GDP is the GDP per capita in each country in thousands of US dollars; 
SOX is an indicator variable coded 1 if fiscal years are after 2001 and 0 otherwise. 





Abbott, L., S. Parket, and G. Peters. 2006. Earnings management, litigation risk, and asymmetric 
audit fee responses.  Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 25 (1): 85-98. 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., D. Collins, W. Kinney Jr., and R. Lafond. 2009. The effect of SOX 
internal control deficiencies on firm risk and cost of equity.  Journal of Accounting 
Research 47 (1): 1-43. 
Bandyopadhyay, S.P., and J.L. Kao. 2001. Competition and Big 6 brand name reputation: 
Evidence from the Ontario municipal audit market. Contemporary Accounting Research 
18 (1): 27–64. 
Baron, R. M., and D. A. Kenny. 1986. The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social 
psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 51 (6): 1173-1182. 
Becker, C., M. Defond, J. Jiambalvo, and K.R. Subramaniam. 1993.  The effect of audit quality 
on earnings management.  Contemporary Accounting Research 15 (1): 1-24. 
Cahan, S., J. Godfrey, J. Hamilton, and D. Jeter.  2008.  Auditor specialization, auditor 
dominance, and audit fees: the role of investment opportunities. The Accounting Review 
83 (6): 1393-1423. 
Caramanis, C., and C. Lennox. 2008. Audit effort and earnings management. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 45 (1): 116–38. 
Carson, E.  2009.  Industry specialization by global audit firm networks.  The Accounting Review 
84 (2): 355-382. 
78 
 
Carson, E., R. Simnet, B. Soo, and A. Wright.  2011.  The effect of changes in audit firm 
competition on the Big N premium.  Forthcoming in Auditing: A Journal of Practice & 
Theory. 
Chan, P., M. Ezzamel, and D. Gwiluam. 1993. Determinants of audit fees for quoted UK 
companies. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 20 (6): 765-86. 
Chop, J.-H., J.-B. Kim, and Y. Zang. 2010.  Do abnormally high audit fees impair audit quality? 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 29 (2): 115-140. 
Choi, J. –H., J. –B. Kim, X. Liu, and D. Simunic. 2008. Audit pricing, legal liability regimes, 
and Big 4 premiums: Theory and cross-country evidence. Contemporary Accounting 
Research 25 (1): 55-99. 
Choi, J.H., and T.J. Wong. 2007.  Auditors' governance functions and legal environments: An 
international investigation.  Contemporary Accounting Research 24 (1): 13-46. 
Cox, J.  2006.  The oligopolistic gatekeeper: The U.S. accounting profession.  Available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/1577/. 
Craswell, A., D. Stokes, and J. Laughton. 2002. Auditor independence and fee dependence. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 33 (2): 253-275. 
Crittenden, V., L. Davis, D. Simon, and. G. Trompeter. 2003. Deregulation of professional 
accounting services in the United Kingdom: Integrating marketing and accounting. 
Journal of Strategic Marketing 11 (1): 37–54. 
Danos, P., and J. Eicherlseher, 1986.  Long-term trends toward seller concentration in the U.S. 
audit market, The Accounting Review 61 (4): 633-650. 
79 
 
Danos, Paul, and John W. Eichenseher 1982.  Audit industry dynamics: Factors affecting 
changes in client-industry market shares.  Journal of Accounting Research 20 (2): 604-
616.  
DeFond, M. L., J. R. Francis, and T. J. Wong. 2000. Auditor industry specialization and market 
segmentation: Evidence from Hong Kong. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 19 
(1): 49-66. 
Denison, C., 2009. Real options and escalation of commitment: a behavioral analysis of capital 
investment decisions.  The Accounting Review 84 (1): 133-155. 
Eiehenseher, J. and P. Danos, 1981, The analysis of industry specific concentration: Toward an 
explanatory model, The Accounting Review 56 (3): 479-492. 
European Commission. 2010. Green paper: Audit policy: Lessons from the crisis. Brussels: 
European Commission.   
Francis, J. R., and D. T. Simon, 1987. A test of audit pricing in the small-client segment of the 
U.S. audit market. The Accounting Review 62 (1): 145-57. 
Francis, J., P. Michas., and S. Seavey.  2012.  Does audit market concentration harm the quality 
of audited earnings? Evidence from audit markets in 42 countries.  Working paper.   
Frankel, R., M. Johnson, and K. Nelson. 2002. The Relation between Auditors’ Fees for 
Nonaudit Services and Earnings Management. The Accounting Review 77 (Supplement): 
71-105. 
Gieger, M., and D. Rama. 2003. Audit fees, nonaudit fees, and auditor reporting on stressed 
companies. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 22 (2): 53-69. 
Government Accountability Office, 2003.  Mandated study on consolidation and competition.  
Available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03864.pdf. 
80 
 
Gul, F., C. Chen, and J. Tsui.  2003. Discretionary accruals, managers’ incentives, and audit fees. 
Contemporary Accounting Research 20 (3): 441–464. 
Hay, D., and W. R., Knechel. 2010. The effects of advertising and solicitation on audit fees. 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 29 (1): 60-81. 
Jope, O-K., and Langli, J.  2010.  Auditor independence in a private firm and low litigation risk 
setting.  The Accounting Review 85 (2): 573-602. 
Hoskisson, R., M. Hitt, D. Ireland, and J. Harrison. 2008.  Competing for Advantage. 2
nd
 ed. 
Mason: Thompson South-Western. 
House of Lords 2010.a. Auditors: market concentration and their role. Volume II: Evidence.  
Select Committee on Economic Affairs. Available on the internet at: 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/economic-
affairs-committee/news/economic-affairs-committee-publishes-call-for-evidence/ 
House of Lords 2010.b. Call for evidence: Auditors: market concentration and their role. Select 
Committee on Economic Affairs. Available on the internet at: 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/economic-
affairs-committee/news/economic-affairs-committee-publishes-call-for-evidence/ 
Ireland, J. C, and C. S. Lennox. 2002. The large audit firm fee premium: A case of selectivity 
bias.  Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 17 (1): 73-90. 
Jones, J.J. 1991. Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations. Journal of 
Accounting Research 29 (2): 193-228. 
Kallapur, S., S. Sankaragururswamy, and Y. Zang. 2010. Audit market competition and audit 
quality. Working Paper. 
81 
 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 2006. What works in securities 
laws? The Journal of Finance 61 (1): 1–32. 
Larcker, D., and S. Richardson.  2004. Fees paid to audit firms, accruals choices, and corporate 
governance.  Journal of Accounting Research 42 (3): 625-658. 
Lim, C.-Y., and H.-T. Tan. 2008. Non-audit service fees and auditor quality: the impact of 
auditor specialization. Journal of Accounting Research 46 (1): 199 - 246 
Maher, M. W., P. Tiessen, R. Colson, and A.J. Broman. 1992. Competition and audit fees. The 
Accounting Review 67 (1): 199-211. 
Market Participant Group. 2007.  Choice in the UK audit market.  Available on the internet at: 
http://www.frc.org.uk/documents/pagemanager/frc/FRCMPG%20Final%20Report%20fo
r%20web.pdf. 
Numan, W., and M. Willekens. 2011 Competitive pressure, audit quality and industry 
specialization. Working paper. 
Pearson, T., and G. Trompeter. 1994. Competition in the market for audit services: The effect of 
supplier concentration on audit fees. Contemporary Accounting Research 11 (1): 91-114. 
Reffett, A. 2010. Can Identifying and Investigating Fraud Risks Increase Auditors' Liability? The 
Accounting Review 85 (6): 2145-2167 
Sanders, G., A. Allen, and L. Korte. 1995. Municipal audit fees: Has increased competition made 
a difference? Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 14 (1): 105–114. 
Simunic, D. A. 1980. The pricing of audit services: Theory and evidence. Journal of Accounting 
Research 22 (3): 161 - 190. 
Sirindhi, B., and F. Gul. 2007. The differential effects of auditors' nonaudit and audit fees on 




United States Treasury. 2008. Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession: Final Report, 
October 6, 2008. Report is available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-
finance/acap/docs/final-report.pdf 
Unites States Senate Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management. 1976. The ac-
counting establishment. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 
Weber, J., M. Willenborg and J. Zhang. 2008. Does auditor reputation matter? The case of 
KPMG Germany and ComROAD AG. Journal of Accounting Research 46 (4): 941-972. 
Wingate, M. 1997. An examination of cultural influence on audit environments.  Research In 






ACCEPTING FULL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE AUDIT OPINION: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR AUDIT QUALITY AND AUDIT FEES 
Introduction  
This study examines the issue of accountability in financial reporting by focusing on a 
special type of audit opinion that allows an auditor to limit his or her accountability for an 
engagement.  Current United States standards allow the principal auditor to disavow 
responsibility for parts of the audit which were performed by a third party auditor (AU-C Section 
600).  Such sharing of responsibility is accomplished by referencing third party auditors in the 
audit opinion and then indicating the part of the audit which was performed by that third party.  
Specifically, this study examines 1) audit quality implications related to such opinions, and 2) the 
relationship between having a shared opinion and audit fees.   
The study is motivated by current differences between the United States and international 
standards. International standards (ISA 600) do not allow such a disclaimer: the principal auditor 
has to be comfortable with all the procedures performed – and conclusions drawn – by other 
auditors, because no reference to other auditors is permitted under international standards.  
Therefore under international standards the principal auditor is fully accountable for the entire 
audit.  This study addresses two issues related to disclaiming responsibility for the work 
performed by the component auditor: is audit quality negatively affected and do such audits cost 
less? 
Prior research has confirmed that accountability affects positively the quality of audit 
procedures (Johnson et al., 1991; Kennedy, 1993; Asare et al., 2000).  If the principal auditor is 
not allowed – or does not elect – to refer to the work of the second auditor in the audit opinion, 
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then the principal auditor is fully accountable for the entire audit.  Presumably, in these cases, the 
principal auditor is comfortable with the procedures performed by a component auditor and the 
audit quality produced by the component auditor.
17
  This paper tests whether audit quality is 
higher in cases where the principal auditor assumes full responsibility for the audit, as compared 
to cases where a third party auditor is referenced.   
Involving a third party auditor and referencing them in the audit opinion might also be 
motivated by cost savings: the principal auditor might involve a third party auditor if such 
auditor can perform a part of the audit for a low fee. This paper analyzes whether the audit fees 
are different between shared audit opinions and cases where no third party auditor is referenced.  
Audit quality is measured using discretionary accruals.  All companies whose 10-k report 
included a reference to a third party auditor were matched by current year return on assets with a 
control company.  The results show that the absolute discretionary accruals are significantly 
higher (meaning the audit quality is significantly lower) for the firms whose audit opinion 
referenced a third party auditor.  The results provide some evidence that audit fees are lower in 
shared responsibility situations; these results are stronger if observations from 2012 are 
excluded.  This could be driven by the fact that starting in 2012 new regulations increased 
involvement of the principal auditor in group audits, which would allow the principal auditor to 
ensure that the quality of work by the component auditor is acceptable by the principal auditor’s 
standards.  Such additional involvement on the part of the principal auditor would also increase 
billable hours, which would lead to higher fees.   
                                                 
17 Component auditor is defined as an auditor who, at the request of the group engagement team, 
performs work on financial information related to a component for the group audit. 
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This paper contributes to research, regulation, and practice.  This paper addresses the 
current regulatory debate about the responsibility of the principal auditor in the group audit 
environment
18
.  To the extent that audit committees are interested in having a high quality audit, 
they might be concerned about having their auditors involve third parties and not assuming the 
full responsibility for their work.  Finally, audit firms can find the study important because it 
addresses audit quality and the audit fee implications of engagements that have shared 
responsibility.   
The paper is organized in the following sections: institutional background, theoretical 
background and hypotheses development, methods, sample selection procedures, results, and 
conclusion.   
 
Institutional Background 
United States Standards  
Audits of large, geographically dispersed clients can require the coordination of auditors 
in multiple locations. In certain cases, legal restrictions, convenience or cost may cause the 
principal auditor to involve a third party public accounting firm to perform parts of the audit.  
This may occur in situations where, for example, local regulation prevents non-domestic auditors 
                                                 
18
 The term group audit is used by IAASB (2007) to refer to the audit of group financial 
statements.  It is similar to the audit of consolidated financial statements in the US.  A 
component is an entity or business activity for which group or component management prepares 




from conducting attest engagements (Japan, India or Pakistan), or where a large client may have 
operations in regions where the auditor does not have local offices
19
.  
In the US, group audits followed the guidance from AU Section 543 from 1972 until 
2012.  AU-C Section 600, Special Considerations—Audits of Group Financial Statements 
(Including the Work of Component Auditors) superseded AU Section 543 for all audits for the 
periods beginning after December 15, 2012.  Since the sample used in this study covers fiscal 
years 2004-2012, both AU 543 as well as AU-C Section 600 are described in this section. 
AU Section 543 
When using the work of another auditor, the principal auditor addresses two issues.  First, 
the accounting firm must determine whether it performed a sufficient portion of the audit to be 
considered the principal auditor.  Second, the accounting firm needs to determine if the work of a 
third party auditor will be referenced.  The principal auditor must determine whether or not it is 
willing to accept responsibility for the work of the other auditors.  If the principal auditor decides 
that it is unwilling to assume the responsibility, then it must reference the work of the other 
auditors in the audit opinion.   
An example of such reference is provided in AU Section 543, par. 09 (AICPA, 1972):  
                                                 
19
 Shared opinions in the US are different from the audits in France.  In the US the principal 
auditor can choose to involve a component auditor, while in France each public company must 
be audited by two auditors, who divide the work (i.e. one does not serve as an independent 
reviewer of the other).  The rationales behind this, as summarized in Francis et al. (2009), are 1) 
to avoid any delays in case of default of one auditor; and 2) to protect auditor independence.  
Under these conditions, US GAAS permits the principal auditor to rely on the work of the other 
firm. Further, the principal auditor is permitted to share its responsibility for the portion 
conducted by the other firm by acknowledging its reliance on the work of another auditor in the 
audit opinion.    
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“We did not audit the financial statements of B Company, a wholly-owned subsidiary, 
which statements reflect total assets and revenues constituting 20 percent and 22 percent, 
respectively, of the related consolidated totals”. 
Assuming the auditor does accept full responsibility for the entire engagement, AU 
Section 543, par. 12., dictated that the firm should obtain (among other items) “b) a list of 
significant risks, the auditor's responses, and the results of the auditor's related procedures, c) 
sufficient information relating to significant findings or issues that are inconsistent with or 
contradict the auditor's final conclusions(…); d) any findings affecting the consolidating or 
combining of accounts in the consolidated financial statements” (AICPA, 1972).  This 
information was deemed necessary as the principal auditor was required to be comfortable with 
the work performed by other auditors, in cases where the principal auditor was willing to accept 
the full responsibility and potential legal liability associated with the audit. 
In cases where the principal auditor chose to reference a third party auditor, the principal 
auditor did not assume responsibility of the work performed by the third party.  In such cases, 
AU Section 543, par. 10 dictated that the principal auditor “should make inquiries concerning the 
professional reputation and independence of the other auditor. He also should adopt appropriate 
measures to assure the coordination of his activities with those of the other auditor in order to 
achieve a proper review of matters affecting the consolidating or combining of accounts in the 
financial statements”, however the principal auditor did not review the work by other auditors, 
and the responsibility stayed with the third party. 
AU-C Section 600 
AU-C Section 600 made the requirement in the US more similar to the requirements 
under ISA 600, specifically in the areas related to risk assessment, materiality, and responsibility.  
AU Section 543 did not include requirements related to the performance of risk assessment.  AU 
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Section 543 also did not include requirements to assess materiality of the component auditor.  
AU-C Section 600 addresses these limitations by requiring the group engagement team to 
establish materiality for the component auditor and requiring the group engagement team to “be 
involved in the risk assessment of the component to identify significant risks of material 
misstatement of the group financial statements” (par. 56).   
AU-C Section 600 also increases the responsibility of the group engagement partner. 
According to paragraph 13, “the group engagement partner is responsible for (1) the direction, 
supervision, and performance of the group audit engagement in compliance with professional 
standards, applicable regulatory and legal requirements, and the firm’s policies and procedures; 
and (2) determining whether the auditor’s report that is issued is appropriate in the 
circumstances” (AICPA, 2011). 
While AU-C Section 600 brings the requirements related to group audits closer to the 
requirements under ISA 600, one main difference between the US and the international standards 
still exists: the group engagement team can still chose to “not assume responsibility for, and 
accordingly make reference to, the audit of a component auditor in the auditor’s report on the 
group financial statements” (par. 08).    
International Standards  
Looking beyond the US, a number of countries have adopted International Standards of 
Auditing as promulgated by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB). 
In accordance with IAASB standards, international group audits for periods beginning on or after 
December 15, 2009 have to follow the guidelines in ISA 600.  Similar to the US standards, ISA 
600 requires principal auditors to understand  “(a) Whether the component auditor understands 
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and will comply with the ethical requirements that are relevant to the group audit and, in 
particular, is independent;  (b) The component auditor’s professional competence (IAASB, 
2007).  In particular, ISA 600 states: “the group engagement partner
20
 is responsible for the 
direction, supervision and performance of the group audit engagement in compliance with 
professional standards and regulatory and legal requirements, and whether the auditor’s report 
that is issued is appropriate in the circumstances.” As a result, the auditor’s report on the group 
financial statements “shall not refer to a component auditor, unless required by law or regulation 
to include such reference” (IAASB, 2007).   
Thus, under international requirements, the principal auditor carries the full responsibility 
for the audit.  Therefore under ISA 600, a group audit is viewed as an integrated process 
involving multiple firms but where one firm is ultimately responsible for the final opinion.  The 
standard does not permit a division of responsibility.  Under such reporting requirements, the 
principal auditor is assumed to be more highly motivated to exercise due professional care over 
the entire engagement in order to avoid legal liability issues or loss of reputation.   
Shared Opinions, Audit Quality and Audit Fees 
Accountability is an important concept in quality control of financial statement audits.  
Auditors make their decision considering multiple consequences of their actions.  An example of 
a consequence is a law-suit filed because of an audit failure, which can hurt the audit firm 
economically if it is forced to pay a settlement.  Litigation can also hurt audit firms by damaging 
their reputation.  Auditors are accountable for the procedures performed during their audits.  An 
                                                 
20 Group engagement partner – the partner or other person in the firm who is responsible for the 
group audit engagement and its performance, and for the auditor’s report on the group financial 
statements that is issued on behalf of the audit firm (IAASB, 2007).  
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auditor is likely to lose law-suits in cases when the law suit is based on a failure in audit 
procedures for which the firm was accountable.  Consequently, if auditors are accountable for 
their work, they are expected to exercise the best due professional care in order to minimize the 
chance of an audit failure and resulting damaging consequences.  The difference between the US 
and international standards discussed relates to the difference in accountability – ISA 600 
requires the principal auditor to be accountable for the entire audit, while AU-C Section 600 
allows the principal auditors to limit their accountability.  
Referencing a component auditor in the report implies that the principal auditor is not 
accountable for the work performed by a third party.  Prior research has examined the 
relationship between accountability and quality of audit work.  Accountability has been shown to 
increase accuracy (Ashton, 1990), consensus among auditors (Johnson et al., 1991) and effort 
(Asare, 2000).  Accountability has also been shown to reduce effort related biases (Kennedy, 
1993). To summarize, prior literature has shown a positive relation between accountability and 
auditor judgment, and good auditor judgment is necessary for a high quality audit.  One of the 
characteristics of high quality audits is mitigation of earnings management, which refers to 
manipulations of accounting numbers by management for opportunistic reasons (DeAngelo, 
1981; Becker et al., 1993).  Therefore accountability of the auditor is expected to be associated 
with reduced earnings management.    
As noted earlier, involvement of a third party auditor may be more common for an audit 
of a subsidiary or a segment.  The fact that an entity is a subsidiary/segment does not necessarily 
mean that the entity is more or less likely to have earnings management.  Furthermore, the fact 
that the entity is a subsidiary/segment does not mean that that the auditors are more or less likely 
to detect earnings management.  Where having a subsidiary makes a difference for the purposes 
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of detecting earnings management is the accountability of the principal auditor.  When the 
opinion is not shared, the principal auditor is accountable for the entire audit.  This suggests that 
the principal auditor is sufficiently comfortable with the numbers presented by a subsidiary such 
that the principal auditor is willing to assume full responsibility.  The principal auditor 
accomplishes this by performing a review of the component auditor’s work.  On the other hand, 
when the audit opinion is shared, then the principal auditor is not accountable for the portion 
completed by the component auditor, and the principal auditor is not required to perform a full 
review.  In sum, when the opinion is not shared, the component auditor performs the audit 
procedures, but the work is subsequently reviewed by the principal auditor, which creates 
additional assurance that the financials of the component are not materially misstated.   
I hypothesize that assuming responsibility for the work performed by other auditors 
would increase audit quality.  This means that if some responsibility is disclaimed in the 
opinion the audit quality would be on average lower, which leads to the following hypothesis. 
H1: Lower audit quality will be associated with audit engagements that issue a divided 
responsibility audit opinion. 
One of the reasons why the principal auditor can chose to involve a third party auditor is 
cost considerations: a certain part of the engagement can be completed by a component auditor 
for less than what would it cost the principal auditor.  This situation could occur where the 
engagement requires multi-location work.  The principal auditor might not have an office near 
the required location, which would lead to travel costs.  As such if the principal auditor 
determines that it would be more cost effective to involve a third party, a group audit would 
take place.  Furthermore, if the principal auditor is not accepting responsibility for the opinion, 
the principal auditor’s risk is lower, which would lead to a lower risk-based fee premium.  
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Similarly, if the principal auditor disclaims responsibility, then the principal auditor might 
chose to involve a lower quality (and therefore potentially less costly) component auditor.  
Finally, the principal auditor also might not perform a full review of the work performed by a 
component auditor (since a full review is not required), which again would lead to lower costs.  
In combination, this logic leads to the second hypothesis: 
H2: Lower fees will be associated with audit engagements that issue a divided 
responsibility audit opinion. 
Methods 
Measure of audit quality 
Audit quality is measured using the absolute value of discretionary accruals (Francis, 
1999).  The modified Jones (1991) model is used to estimate discretionary accruals.  
Discretionary accruals are a measure of earnings management: high quality audits are presumed 
to limit earnings management by constraining inappropriate booking of accruals, whether they 
are income increasing (positive) or income decreasing (negative).  Therefore the absolute value 
of accruals is used as a proxy for measure audit quality.  Discretionary accruals are calculated 
following the steps discussed below. 
First, the modified Jones (1991) model (see Equation 11 below) is estimated by 
industry-year using an ordinary least squares regression.  The equation used in this analysis 
includes an intercept, which is consistent with Kothari et al. (2005), who use the equation with 
the constant to control for heteroscedasticity and allow for more symmetry in the measures.   
ACCRt/TAt-1 = β0 + β1 * 1/ TAt-1 + β2 * (REVRECt)/ TAt-1 + β3 * PPEt/ TAt-1 + ε         (11) 
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ACCR refer to total accruals calculated as net income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations minus operating cash flows (Krishnan, 2003).  TAt-1 are total assets in 
the prior period.  REVREC is calculated as the change of revenue from the prior period minus 
the change of receivables from the prior period.  Finally PPE refers to gross property, plant and 
equipment.  Discretionary accruals are obtained by saving the residuals from Equation 11.  All 







The following equation is used to test Hypothesis 1: 
DAC = β0 + β1SHARE + β2BIG4P + β3BIG4C + β4SIZE + β5GROWTH + β6LOSS + 
β7MERGE + β8RESTRUCT + industry fixed effects + year fixed effects + ε      (12) 
 
DAC = the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated in equation 11 as described 
above;   
SHARE = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the observations represent a company 
whose audit opinion had a reference to another auditor and 0 otherwise; 
BIG4P = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the principal auditor was a Big 4 firm, and 0 
otherwise; 
BIG4C = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the component auditor was a Big 4 firm, and 
0 otherwise; 
SIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets;   
GROWTH = the change in revenue from prior year scaled by lagged total assets;   
LOSS = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the company had a loss and 0 otherwise;   
MERGE = the sum of acquisition and merger items divided by total assets;  
RESTRUCT = the sum of restructuring items divided by total assets. 
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SHARE is the independent variable of interest to test hypothesis 1.  H1 predicts that if a 
third party auditor is referenced in the audit opinion, the audit quality will be lower.  Therefore 
the discretionary accruals are expected to be higher, and the expected coefficient is positive.  A 
large body of accounting research has focused on the differences between the BigN and non-
BigN firms.  DeAngelo (1981) argues that auditor size is a surrogate for audit quality.   Francis 
et al. (1999) show that the clients of the Big N firms have lower discretionary accruals.  As 
such, I expect the clients of Big 4 firms to have lower discretionary accruals than the client of 
non-Big 4 auditors. Therefore the expected coefficients on the BIG4P and BIG4C variable are 
negative.  SIZE, GROWTH, and LOSS are control variables commonly used in prior related 
research.  Results from Chan et al. (2008) and Nagy (2010) show that large firms have lower 
discretionary accruals.  Larger firms are followed closely by analysts, have better internal 
control environments and highly trained personnel, which leads to higher quality of financial 
reporting.  Therefore the expected coefficient of SIZE is negative.   
Fast growing firms operate in a rapidly changing environment; therefore such firms are 
likely to have more discretion in their financial reporting.  Consistent with this claim, Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. (2009) and Doyle et al. (2007) show that fast growing firms have higher 
discretionary accruals.  Thus, a positive coefficient on the variable GROWTH is expected.  
Measuring revenue growth as change in revenues scaled by total assets is consistent with 
Ettredge et al. (2008) and used here instead of a simple percentage change in revenue in order to 
include companies that did not have revenues in the prior period.    
Management of poorly performing companies is more likely to engage in earnings 
management to create an appearance of profitability (income increasing accruals).  On the other 
hand, management may be booking additional losses in a bad year (income decreasing accruals) 
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in order to appear more profitable in the following year (“cookie jar reserves”).  As such, the 
expected coefficient on LOSS is positive (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009).   
Merging and restructuring activities lead to a number of changes in the company, which 
would result in more discretion in management’s decision making, and thus opportunities for 
earnings management.  Furthermore, Doyle et al. (2007) show a positive relationship between 
discretionary accruals and restructuring charges.  Consequently, the expected coefficients for 
both MERGE and RESTRUCT are positive.   
Hypothesis 2. 
The following equation is used to test Hypothesis 2: 
FEE = β0 + β1SHARE + β2BIG4P + β3BIG4C + β4SIZE + β5LEV + β6INVREC + 
β7ROA + β8LOSS + β9NEWAUD + industry fixed effects + year fixed effects + ε    (13) 
 
SHARE, BIG4P, BIG4C, SIZE, and LOSS were described in the previous section. 
FEE = natural logarithm of audit fees; 
LEV = total liabilities divided by total assets; 
INVREC = inventories plus receivables divided by total assets; 
ROA = net income divided by total assets; 
NEWAUD = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if this is the initial audit engagement, 0 
otherwise. 
 
SHARE is the independent variable of interest for testing hypothesis 2.  Since I expect 
shared responsibility audits to be associated with lower fees, I expect a negative coefficient for 
SHARE.  Prior research showed that larger companies pay higher fees (Simunic, 1980).  As 
such, the expected coefficient of SIZE is positive.  Prior research also suggests that Big 4 firms 
charge a premium for their services (Choi et al., 2008, Basioudis and Francis, 2007).  Thus I 
expect a positive coefficient for BIG4P and BIG4C.  Audit firms also charge a premium for 
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risky clients.  LEV, ROA, and LOSS are included in the model to control for a company’s risk.  
Companies which are highly leveraged and have a loss are likely to be risky and require 
additional audit procedures (and consequently higher fees), as such the expected coefficients of 
LEV and LOSS are positive (Choi et al, 2010; Simunic and Stein, 1996).   Profitable companies 
are less risky, therefore I expect a negative coefficient on ROA (Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006).  
INVREC is a proxy for a company’s complexity, which is expected to be associated with higher 
audit fees; as such the expected coefficient of INVREC is positive (Choi et al., 2008).  Prior 
research showed that initial audit engagements are associated with reduced audit fees, because 
the firms tend to charge reduced fees to their client in the initial year (Francis, 1984; Francis 
and Simon, 1987); consequently the expected coefficient of NEWAUD is negative. 
Sample Selection 
EDGAR allows searching for full text filings in the past four years.  Data for this study 
was collected in 2011 and 2013, so EDGAR had full text filings available for the years 2007-
2012. EDGAR database was searched for the phrase "the report of the other auditors" in order 
to identify the companies that used multiple auditors, and where the principal auditor referenced 
the other auditor.  Review of the results showed that some companies reference the work by 
third party auditors in multiple years.  Annual reports for such companies were obtained for the 
periods prior to 2007; this allowed expanding the sample to include observations from 2004-
2006.  However, in many cases the principal auditor referenced another auditor’s work 
performed in prior periods, but not in the current year; (e.g. “we have audited the accompanying 
balance sheet of as of May 31, 2011 …  We did not audit the Company’s financial statements as 
of and for the year ended May 31, 2010, … which were audited by other auditors.) After such 
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observations were eliminated, 138 companies were left.  Reports of the vast majority of the 
companies referenced other auditors for their work performed on a subsidiary, e.g. “We did not 
audit the financial statements of Orbit/FR Engineering, Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary, which 
statements reflect total assets of $7,944,000 and $6,645,000 as of December 31, 2007 and 2006, 
respectively, and total revenues of $14,530,000, $10,202,000, and $9,160,000 for each of the 
three years in the period ended December 31, 2007”.  Several reports referenced auditing of an 
investment, e.g. “we did not audit the financial statements of Tarsa Therapeutics, Inc., the 
investment in which, as discussed in Note 10 to the financial statements, is accounted for by the 
equity method of accounting”.  138 observations from 2004 to 2012 which referenced a third 
party auditor in their 10-k filings were identified.  However only 109 of them identified the 
component auditors and had the required data to calculate all variables for the quality analysis.  
And only 94 of them had all the variables to perform the fee analysis.   
Quality Analysis 
Data to calculate discretionary accruals and control variables were obtained from the 
Compustat database.  Consistent with prior research (Krishnan, 2003; Ayers et al., 2006), all 
observations from the financial services (SIC codes 6000 to 6999) and utilities (SIC code 4000 
to 4999) are excluded.  Companies included in Compustat as non-classifiable establishments 
(industries 9900 to 9999) are also excluded from the sample: the cross sectional Jones model is 
estimated by industry because companies in the same industries have similar reporting 
requirements and business cycles, and these assumptions cannot be made about non-classifiable 
establishments.  Consistent with Kothari et al. (2005), two digit industry codes which have less 
than 10 observations per given year were also excluded from the sample.  Finally all 
observations with insufficient data to estimate the Jones model or calculate control variables 
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were also excluded.  Compustat does not identify component auditors, as such this information 
was hand collected from 10-k reports.  Most reports either included a report from the 
component auditor in the 10-k, or identified the component auditor in one of the Exhibits to the 
form 10-k.   
After identifying the companies whose annual reports referenced other auditors who 
performed parts of the audit in the current periods I selected one control firm for each of the 
109 firms in our sample.   As noted in the previous section, audit quality is examined using 
discretionary accruals.  Kothari et al. (2005) recommend matching companies based on industry 
and return on assets for the current year in order to use discretionary accruals.  As such all 
companies in our sample were matched by current year ROA with the control firm provided 
that the control firm 1) was in the same two digit SIC industry, 2) was in the same fiscal year, 
3) had all the data to calculate discretionary accruals, and 4) had the data to calculate all control 
variables.  Firms which did not meet these criteria were disqualified and the next closest firm 
based on the current year ROA was examined for qualification as a control firm.  The final 
sample consists of 218 observations (109 test company-years and 109 control company-years) 
which include 31 unique companies. 
Fee Analysis 
Data to calculate audit fees was obtained from the Audit Analytics Database and hand 
collected for the observations with missing data.  Data for control variables was obtained from 
Compustat.  The criteria for sample selection to test Hypothesis 2 are similar to the criteria used 
in the quality analysis.  The only exception is that industries with less than 10 observations in a 
given year were no longer excluded.  Since company size is the one of the main drivers of audit 
fees (Simunic, 1980), I matched all the test companies by total assets with a control firm, given 
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that the control firm 1) was in the same two digit SIC industry, 2) had the same fiscal year, 3) 
had the fee data, and 4) had the data to calculate all control variables. The final sample consists 
of 188 observations (94 test company-years and 94 control company-years) which include 31 
unique companies.   
Results 
H1: Quality analysis 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests 
The final sample is summarized Tables 14 and 15.  There are 218 total observations 
consisting of 109 test firms (firms whose annual reports make a reference to other auditors) and 
109 control firms.  Table 14 (Columns C and D) includes a summary by industry, indicating that 
chemicals and allied products is the industry with the most split responsibility audit reports.  
Table 15 (Columns B and C) shows distribution by year; years 2004-2006 had fewer 
observations than other years due to the fact the full text search in EDGAR was not available for 
the years 2004-2006. 
Table 16 includes descriptive statistics for the full sample, test firms, and controls firms 
respectively.  The table also includes results of univariate tests for all variables between the test 
and control samples.  Univariate analyses show that test firms are larger
21
 than control firms and 
have more restructuring charges (however the difference is only marginally significant).  Table 
                                                 
21 Larger firms have been shown to have smaller discretionary accruals (Francis et al., 1999).  
The test sample is comprised of larger firms, therefore if the size differential does, in part, 
account for any differences, it should be biasing against my results of finding larger discretionary 
accruals for the test sample. 
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18 includes a correlation matrix for all variables.  Absolute discretionary accruals are 
significantly negatively correlated with SIZE, BIG4P, and positively correlated with MERGE.   
Multivariate Results 
A positive relationship was predicted between having a split responsibility in the audit 
opinion and the absolute value of discretionary accruals in Hypothesis 1.  The hypotheses are 
tested using the pooled cross sectional regression presented in Equation 12.  The model is 
estimated using robust standard errors to adjust for heteroscedasticity and company level 
clustering.  Results of the regression are included in Table 20.  The model has relatively high 
explanatory power, as suggested by adjusted R-squared of almost 0.39.  The coefficient for 
SHARE is significantly positive at the 5% level (t=2.06, p-value = 0.042).  This shows that 
those firms that involve more than one auditor and whose principal auditor does not assume the 
full responsibility for the audit have significantly higher absolute discretionary accruals than the 
control firms.  As such, the results provide support for the hypothesis that audit quality suffers 
in cases where the audit partner does not accept full responsibility for the audit.  The control 
variable SIZE was statistically significantly negative (t=-2.25, p=0.009), as expected, which 
shows that the large firms tend to have lower discretionary accruals.  Surprisingly, neither 
BIG4P nor BIG4C were associated with higher earnings quality.  MERGE was significantly 
associated with absolute discretionary accruals (t=6.14, p<0.001).  The other control variables 
were not significant.  In order to determine if the model has a muilticollinearity problem, the 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF’s) of the regression were examined.  No VIF’s were greater 
than the cut-off value of 10.   
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H2: Fee Analysis 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests  
Table 14 includes a summary of the sample by industry (Columns E and F) and Table 
15 includes a summary by fiscal year (Columns D and E).  The sample consists of 94 test 
companies (companies whose 10-k made a reference to parts of the audit performed by third 
party auditors) and 94 control companies.  The sample used in testing Hypothesis 2 has fewer 
observations than the sample used for testing Hypothesis 1 due to data availability.  Similar to 
the sample used in the quality analysis, Chemicals and Allied Products has more split 
responsibility reports than other industries in the sample.  Descriptive statistics and univariate 
results included in Table 17 suggest that companies with split responsibility reports are more 
leveraged and are marginally (significant at the 10% level) more likely to have an auditor 
switch.  A correlation matrix is included in Table 19.  Audit fees are significantly positively 
correlated with having a Big 4 auditor (BIG4P as well as BIG4C), SIZE, ROA, and INVREC; 
fees are significantly negatively correlated with having a loss.   
Multivariate Results 
Hypothesis 2 is tested by estimating Equation 13.  Similar to the quality analysis, the 
equation is estimated using robust standard errors and clustering by company.  Hypothesis 2 
predicts a negative relationship between audit fees and having a shared opinion.  Multivariate 
results are summarized in Table 21.  The coefficient of SHARE is negative and marginally 
significant (t-value of -1.75), providing some support for the hypothesis.  As expected, the 
coefficients for BIG4P, SIZE, and INVREC are significantly positive, and the coefficient for 
ROA is significantly negative. Other control variables are not significant.  VIF’s of the 
regression were examined to determine if there are multicollinearity issues.  The highest VIF is 
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11.79, four variables in the regression have VIF’s over 10.  Three of those variables are dummy 
variables for industries, when the equation was re-estimated excluding observations from those 
industries, the results remained qualitatively the same.  The other variable which has a VIF of 
over 10 is SIZE  (11.74).  Since size is the most important variable in determining audit fees 
and VIF is only slightly over 10, the variable was retained in the model. 
Because AU-C Section 600 brought changes in requirement for group audits in 2012, I 
re-estimated Equation 13 excluding observations from that year.  The results (untabulated) 
show that the coefficient of SHARE became more significantly negative (t=-2.09, p=.039).  
This suggests that under AU 543 requirements, when the principal auditor had less involvement 
in the work of the component auditor, audit fees were significantly lower in split responsibility 
reports.  However, after AU-C Section 600 required additional involvement on the part of the 
principal auditor, this led to higher audit fees.  I re-estimated Equation 3 using only the 
observations from 2012, and the coefficient on SHARE was significantly positive (t=2.69, 
p=.014).  However these results are only based on 20 observations, and thus might not be 
representative of the population.   
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to determine the effect of auditor’s ability to disclaim 
responsibility on audit quality and audit fees.  The study was motivated by the differences 
between the US and international standards.  Under IAS 600, which is used internationally, the 
principal auditor assumes responsibility for any work done by a component auditor.  This means 
that the principal auditor is fully accountable for the entire audit:  “although other auditors may 
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perform work on the financial information of components for the group audit and as such are 
responsible for their overall findings, conclusions or opinion in their memoranda or reports of 
work performed, the group auditor alone is responsible for the group audit opinion.” 
(International Federation of Accountants, 2007).  On the other hand the standards in the United 
States allow the principal auditor to disclaim responsibility for any work performed by a third 
party by referencing that party in the audit opinion and indicating the part of the audit that that 
party performed.  Prior research showed a positive relationship between accountability and 
auditor judgment (Ashton, 1990, Johnson et al., 1991, Asare, 2000), which suggests that 
accountability is important for high quality audits.  Since US standards do not require the 
principal auditor to be accountable for the work of the component auditor by issuing a shared 
opinion, audit quality can suffer when the opinion is shared.   This paper examines this important 
difference between the US with respect to quality of shared opinions.   
Audit quality was measured using discretionary accruals estimated using the modified 
Jones (1991) model.  The sample consists of firms whose audit opinions referenced a third party 
auditor.  Each of these firms was matched with a control firm based on current year’s industry 
and return on assets (for the quality analysis) or current year’s industry and total assets (for the 
fee analysis).  The results showed that companies whose auditors disclaimed responsibility for 
parts of the audit had significantly higher discretionary accruals, suggesting that the quality of 
their audits was lower.  The results also suggested that having a shared responsibility report was 
associated with lower audit fees; this was more pronounced in the years which were under 
guidance from AU 543, which required less involvement from the principal auditor than new 
requirements under AU-C Section 600.  Essentially the results show that in cases where the 
principal auditor disclaims responsibility for parts performed by a component auditor, the 
104 
 
principal auditor tends to hire a less costly component auditor (as suggested by the fee 
analysis), which leads to lower quality audits (as suggested by the quality analysis).   
The results are important for researchers, regulators, and practice.  This is the first paper 
in accounting research which examines audit quality issues related to the principal auditor’s 
ability to disclaim responsibility for a portion of the audit.  AU-C Section 600 increases the 
accountability of the group engagement partner for the work of component auditors.  Prior 
research shows that increased accountability leads to higher quality audits.  However AU-C 
Section 600 still allows referencing another auditor in the opinion.  GAO issued a comment on 
shared opinions, stating that allowing the principal auditor to disclaim responsibility for 
component auditor’s work “can improve audit efficiency for the group auditor without 
sacrificing effectiveness” (Government Accountability Office, 2009).  Results in this study 
suggest that while there are some efficiencies associated with shared opinions (lower audit fees), 
effectiveness is sacrificed (lower audit quality).   Finally, with respect to practice, assuming the 
clients are interested in high quality audits, the current study’s results might suggest that 
companies should have their auditor perform the full audit themselves or assume full 
responsibility for the work performed.   
This study brings forth possible avenues for future research.  First, since the sample 
used in this study was too small to investigate the differences between regional and small 
accounting firms, future research can expand the sample and examine such differences.  
Further, behavioral research can focus on the legal liability issues associated with split 





Characteristics of Companies with Shared Opinions 
Shared responsibility is an under-researched topic, and prior research does not show 
which company characteristics increase the likelihood of having a shared audit opinion.  Thus 
characteristics listed below are based on professional literature and anecdotal evidence gained 
from discussion with the personnel involved with audit engagements that generated shared 
responsibility reports.  Several characteristics could potentially be associated with the likelihood 
of having a shared responsibility audit opinion.   
 Geographical location: location of segments and subsidiaries, international operations, 
and small number of office locations can increase the likelihood of receiving a shared 
opinion.    
o Discussion with audit personnel and review of professional literature (Georgiades, 
2008) indicated that shared opinions are more likely when a company has large 
segments or subsidiaries that are audited by a second audit firm.  The decision to 
have a different auditor for a subsidiary could be due to the fact that the 
subsidiary might be located in an area where the principal auditor does not have 
an office.  Alternatively, the parent company might have acquired a subsidiary 
and allowed the subsidiary to retain its auditor.  This can be due to client 
preferences, perhaps driven by a long-standing, pre-existing relationship between 
a subsidiary and its auditor.  The more subsidiaries the company has, the greater is 
the possibility of having one (or more) of them audited by a different firm, which 
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could be referenced in the audit opinion.    The same logic as explained above for 
a number of subsidiaries would also apply to the segments.    
o The existence of foreign operations maybe associated with a shared opinion.  
Some countries have restrictions placed on what part of an audit (if any) can be 
performed by a foreign firm; as such, involving a local component auditor could 
be the only way to complete the audit.  Note: Compustat database does not have 
information on the number of foreign operation, but instead it shows how much 
foreign tax a company pays.  High foreign tax expenses are likely to be associated 
with multiple foreign operations.  As such, foreign tax expense will be used as a 
proxy for the number of foreign operations.  
o As noted above, the principal auditor can engage a component auditor because a 
principal auditor does not have an office in a certain location.  The Big 4 have 
offices all over the world, while many non-Big 4 firms are regional and local.  
Therefore non-Big 4 auditors are relatively more likely to face a situation where 
an audit has to be performed in a location where the firm does not have an office 
than the Big 4 firms.   Therefore, having a non-Big 4 auditor is expected to be 
associated with having a shared audit opinion. 
 Risk: client’s bankruptcy risk and poor operating performance may be associated with 
receiving a shared opinion. 
o If the company is considered to be risky, the principal auditor might not want to 
assume any additional risk by assuming responsibility for the work performed by 
a component auditor.  Companies can be considered risky if their operating 
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performance is low, and if they are facing financial distress (Ashbaugh-Skaife et 
al., 2009).  Therefore companies with shared audit opinions may be more likely to 
have a negative return on assets and have a high probability of bankruptcy, as 
measured by Zmijewski (1984) score. 
The following logit equation is used to analyze which characteristics lead to referencing a 
third party auditor.   
SHARE = β0 + β1SUBS + β2SEGS + β3FOREIGN + β4ZSCORE + β5ROA + 
β6*NONBIG4           
SHARE = an indicator variable coded 1 if there is a component auditor is referenced in 
the audit opinion and 0 otherwise; 
SUBS = equity in earnings – unconsolidated subsidiaries scaled by total assets
22
; 
SEGS = natural log of the number of reported segments; 
FOREIGN = foreign tax expense scaled by total assets; 
ZSCORE = Zmijewski (1984) bankruptcy score; 
ROA = return on assets; 
NONBIG4 = indicator variable coded 1 if the audit firms is non-Big 4, 0 otherwise. 
The equation above was estimated by year, however the results were not significant.  This 
could be partly due to the fact that there are very few observations with shared opinions each 
year.    
                                                 
22
 Equity in earnings (unconsolidated subsidiaries) refers to parent company's portion of 
unremitted earnings from an unconsolidated subsidiary. Compustat does not include the number 
of subsidiaries for each company, as such equity in earnings (unconsolidated subsidiaries) is used 




Table 14 – Industry Summary 
A B  C D E F 
    Quality Fees 






10 Metal Mining 8 3.67% 8 4.26% 
12 Coal Mining 2 0.92% 0 0.00% 
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 14 6.42% 10 5.32% 
20 Food and Kindred Products 0 0.00% 2 1.06% 
22 Textile Mill Products 4 1.83% 4 2.13% 
25 Furniture and Fixtures 4 1.83% 4 2.13% 
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 8 3.67% 6 3.19% 
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 28 12.84% 26 13.83% 
32 Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 4 1.83% 2 1.06% 
34 
Fabricated Metal Products, Except 
Machinery & Transport Equipment 
8 3.67% 8 4.26% 
35 
Industrial and Commercial Machinery and 
Computer Equipment 
12 5.50% 12 6.38% 
36 
Electronic, Electrical Equipment & 
Components, Except Computer Equipment 
18 8.26% 16 8.51% 
37 Transportation Equipment 10 4.59% 10 5.32% 
38 
Measure/Analyze/Control Instruments; 
Photo/Med/Opt Gds; Watches/Clocks 
10 4.59% 8 4.26% 
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 4 1.83% 4 2.13% 
50 Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 12 5.50% 8 4.26% 
51 Wholesale Trade - Nondurable Goods 10 4.59% 6 3.19% 
55 
Automotive Dealers and Gasoline Service 
Stations 
18 8.26% 16 8.51% 
73 Business Services 22 10.09% 16 8.51% 
79 Amusement and Recreation Services 10 4.59% 10 5.32% 
87 
Engineering, Accounting, Research, 
Management & Related Services 
12 5.50% 12 6.38% 




Table 15 - Summary by Year 
A B C D E 











2004 8 3.67% 0 0.00% 
2005 14 6.42% 16 8.51% 
2006 18 8.26% 18 9.57% 
2007 28 12.84% 26 13.83% 
2008 28 12.84% 24 12.77% 
2009 34 15.60% 28 14.89% 
2010 28 12.84% 24 12.77% 
2011 36 16.51% 32 17.02% 
2012 24 11.01% 20 10.64% 












Table 16 - Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests – Quality Analysis 
 
 
Full sample Test sample Control sample 
 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Difference 
DAC 0.1459 0.1881 0.1476 0.1637 0.1441 0.2104 0.0035 
SHARE 0.5000 0.5012 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
BIG4P 0.6697 0.4714 0.7064 0.4575 0.6330 0.4842 0.0734 
BIG4C 0.2248 0.4184 0.4495 0.4997 NA NA NA 
SIZE 6.0354 2.1208 6.4065 2.0858 5.6643 2.0997 0.7423*** 
GROWTH 0.4296 3.3825 0.2365 1.1143 0.6227 4.6552 -0.3863 
LOSS 0.3670 0.4831 0.3670 0.4842 0.3670 0.4842 0.0000 
MERGE 0.0003 0.0081 0.0001 0.0025 0.0005 0.0111 -0.0004 
RESTRUCT -0.0024 0.0118 -0.0035 0.0160 -0.0013 0.0046 -0.0022* 
DAC = the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated in equation 11 SHARE = a 
dichotomous variable coded 1 if the observations represents a company whose audit opinion had 
a reference to another auditor and 0 otherwise; 
SHARE = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the observations represents a company whose audit 
opinion had a reference to another auditor and 0 otherwise; 
BIG4P = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the principal auditor was a Big 4 firm, and 0 
otherwise; 
BIG4C = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the component auditor was a Big 4 firm, and 0 
otherwise; 
SIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets;   
GROWTH = the change in revenue from prior year scaled by lagged total assets;   
LOSS = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the company had a loss and 0 otherwise;   
MERGE = acquisition and merger items divided by total assets;  
RESTRUCT = restructuring items divided by total assets. 









Table 17 - Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests – Fee Analysis 
 
Full sample Test sample Control sample 
 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Difference 
FEE 13.6733 1.4400 13.6629 1.4494 13.6837 1.4381 -0.0208 
SHARE 0.5000 0.5013 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
BIG4P 0.7021 0.4585 0.7234 0.4497 0.6809 0.4686 0.0426 
BIG4C 0.2394 0.4278 0.4787 0.5022 NA NA NA 
SIZE 6.3917 2.1407 6.4085 2.1610 6.3748 2.1316 0.0337 
LEV 0.6226 0.4570 0.7141 0.5212 0.5311 0.3623 0.1829*** 
INVREC 0.2891 0.2231 0.2850 0.2260 0.2932 0.2213 -0.0081 
ROA -0.0499 0.2520 -0.0650 0.2509 -0.0348 0.2536 -0.0302 
LOSS 0.3617 0.4818 0.3617 0.4831 0.3617 0.4831 0.0000 
NEWAUD 0.0798 0.2717 0.1064 0.3100 0.0532 0.2256 0.0532* 
FEE = natural logarithm of audit fee;  
SHARE = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the observations represents a company whose audit 
opinion had a reference to another auditor and 0 otherwise; 
BIG4P = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the principal auditor was a Big 4 firm, and 0 
otherwise; 
BIG4C = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the component auditor was a Big 4 firm, and 0 
otherwise; 
SIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets;   
LEV = total liabilities divided by total assets; 
INVREC = inventories plus receivables divided by total assets; 
ROA = net income divided by total assets; 
NEWAUD = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if this is the initial audit engagement, 0 otherwise. 










Table 18 - Correlation Matrix - Quality Analysis 
 
DAC SHARE BIG4P BIG4C SIZE GROWTH LOSS 
DAC 1.0000 
      SHARE 0.0094 1.0000 
     
 
0.8903 
      BIG4P -0.2247 0.0780 1.0000 
    
 
0.0008 0.2513 
     BIG4C -0.0860 0.5385 0.1445 1.0000 
   
 
0.2061 0.0000 0.0330 
    SIZE -0.3768 0.1754 0.5442 0.3707 1.0000 
  
 
0.0000 0.0095 0.0000 0.0000 
   GROWTH 0.0685 -0.0572 -0.1524 -0.0549 -0.1424 1.0000 
 
 
0.3137 0.4004 0.0245 0.4202 0.0356 
  LOSS 0.1045 0.0000 -0.1938 0.0232 -0.3793 0.0709 1.0000 
 
0.1238 1.0000 0.0041 0.7332 0.0000 0.2971 
 MERGE 0.4914 -0.0226 -0.1136 -0.0264 -0.1078 0.1369 -0.0761 
 
0.0000 0.7398 0.0942 0.6978 0.1125 0.0435 0.2630 
RESTRUCT -0.0002 -0.0941 -0.0675 -0.1204 0.0150 0.0247 -0.1735 
 
0.9974 0.1662 0.3209 0.0760 0.8252 0.7166 0.0103 
        
        
 
MERGE RESTRUCT 
    MERGE 1.0000 
      RESTRUCT 0.0199 1.0000 
     
 
0.7697 
      DAC = the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated in equation 11;  
SHARE = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the observations represents a company whose audit 
opinion had a reference to another auditor and 0 otherwise; 
SHARE = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the observations represents a company whose audit 
opinion had a reference to another auditor and 0 otherwise; 
BIG4P = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the principal auditor was a Big 4 firm, and 0 
otherwise; 
BIG4C = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the component auditor was a Big 4 firm, and 0 
otherwise; 
SIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets;   
GROWTH = the change in revenue from prior year scaled by lagged total assets;   
LOSS = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the company had a loss and 0 otherwise;   
MERGE = acquisition and merger items divided by total assets;  





Table 19 - Table Correlation Matrix - Fee Analysis 
 
FEE SHARE BIG4P BIG4C SIZE LEV INVREC 
FEE 1.0000 
      SHARE -0.0072 1.0000 
     BIG4P 0.5201 0.0465 1.0000 
    BIG4C 0.2723 0.5610 0.1201 1.0000 
   SIZE 0.8769 0.0079 0.5369 0.2841 1.0000 
  LEV 0.0367 0.2007 -0.0925 0.2272 -0.0652 1.0000 
 INVREC 0.1634 -0.0183 0.0566 -0.1772 0.0451 0.0257 1.0000 
ROA  0.4402 -0.0601 0.3616 -0.0378 0.5291 -0.4821 0.2798 
LOSS -0.3489 0.0000 -0.2117 0.0707 -0.3963 0.2065 -0.2307 
NEWAUD -0.0864 0.0982 -0.2375 -0.0272 -0.0227 -0.0715 -0.1002 
        
        
 
ROA LOSS NEWAUD 
   ROA 1.0000 
      LOSS -0.5954 1.0000 
     NEWAUD -0.0413 0.0235 1.0000 
    FEE = natural logarithm of audit fee;  
SHARE = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the observations represents a company whose audit 
opinion had a reference to another auditor and 0 otherwise; 
BIG4P = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the principal auditor was a Big 4 firm, and 0 
otherwise; 
BIG4C = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the component auditor was a Big 4 firm, and 0 
otherwise; 
SIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets;   
LEV = total liabilities divided by total assets; 
INVREC = inventories plus receivables divided by total assets; 
ROA = net income divided by total assets; 
NEWAUD = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if this is the initial audit engagement, 0 otherwise. 
 





Intercept ? 0.3077 0.00 
SHARE + 0.0528 2.06** 
BIG4 - 0.0099 0.23 
BIG4C - -0.0525 -1.50 
SIZE - -0.0281 -2.25** 
GROWTH + 0.0022 1.14 
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LOSS + -0.0228 -1.15 
MERGE + 10.6625 6.14*** 
RESTRUCT + 0.3732 0.46 
    R-squared 0.4859 
  DAC = the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated in equation 11;  
SHARE = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the observations represents a company whose audit 
opinion had a reference to another auditor and 0 otherwise; 
SHARE = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the observations represents a company whose audit 
opinion had a reference to another auditor and 0 otherwise; 
BIG4P = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the principal auditor was a Big 4 firm, and 0 
otherwise; 
BIG4C = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the component auditor was a Big 4 firm, and 0 
otherwise; 
SIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets;   
GROWTH = the change in revenue from prior year scaled by lagged total assets;   
LOSS = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the company had a loss and 0 otherwise;   
MERGE = acquisition and merger items divided by total assets;  
RESTRUCT = restructuring items divided by total assets. 















  SHARE - -0.1894 -1.75* 
BIG4P + 0.2962 2.38** 
BIG4C + 0.2219 1.36 
SIZE + 0.5307 9.73*** 
LEV + 0.1397 1.33 
INVREC + 1.0886 3.47*** 
ROA - -0.6979 -2.2** 
LOSS + -0.0733 -0.77 
NEWAUD - -0.1117 -0.87 
    R-squared 0.9256 
  FEE = natural logarithm of audit fee;  
SHARE = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the observations represents a company whose audit 
opinion had a reference to another auditor and 0 otherwise; 
BIG4P = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the principal auditor was a Big 4 firm, and 0 
otherwise; 
BIG4C = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the component auditor was a Big 4 firm, and 0 
otherwise; 
SIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets;   
LEV = total liabilities divided by total assets; 
INVREC = inventories plus receivables divided by total assets; 
ROA = net income divided by total assets; 
NEWAUD = a dichotomous variable coded 1 if this is the initial audit engagement, 0 otherwise. 
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